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RESIDENTIAL PROTECTIONISM AND THE 
LEGAL MYTHOLOGY OF HOME 
Stephanie M. Stern* 
The theory that one’s home is a psychologically special form of 
property has become a cherished principle of property law, cited by 
legislators and touted extensively in the legal scholarship. Influen-
tial scholars, most notably Margaret Radin, have asserted that 
ongoing control over one’s home is necessary for an individual’s 
very personhood and ability to flourish in society. Other commenta-
tors have expounded a communitarian vision of the home as rooting 
e is evidence, as discussed in Part III, that dislocation that results in 
reduced social interaction and relationships is detrimental. Also, 
dislocation that separates families or impacts family relations is 
likely to impose psychmacy of the home has encouraged the 
overproduction of home-protective legislation and added a gloss of 
moral legitimacy to rent seeking. In light of the political ground-
swell to “save homes” and the social costs of residential 
protectionism, it is time for a critical reexamination of the psycho-
logical importance attributed to the home. Drawing on the research 
literature in psychology, sociology, and demography, this Article 
argues that there is scant evidence to support the theory that one’s 
home is a special object that constitutes psychological personhood 
or enables a rich web of territorial relationships. The psychology 
research illustrates the primacy of social relations, not possessions, 
to self and flourishing. The sociological and demographic data in-
dicate that closely-knit, low-turnover territorial neighborhoods are 
the exception, not the norm. In view of the high costs and limited 
psychological benefits of protectionism, I advance an evidence-
based and minimal approach to residential protection. 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Beginning in
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Katyal, Eduardo Peñalver, Jide Nzelibe, James Ely, Fred LeBaron, Dan Hamilton, Juliet  
Moringiello, Joshua Melson, Carol Rose, and Henry Melson-Stern for their helpful suggestions and 
comments. I have also benefited greatly from presentations at the University of Illinois College of 
Law; the Georgetown School of Law Workshop on Property, Citizenship, and Social Entrepre-
neurism; and the William & Mary School of Law Brigham–Kanner Property Rights conference. I 
thank Jacqueline Kontry for her able research assistance. 
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Introduction 
Residential real estate has achieved an exalted status and privileged po-
sition in American property law. In the past century, there has been a 
proliferation of legislation that protects and privileges homeowners by re-
ducing the risk of dislocation and extracting rents to the detriment of non-
owners and lower-income owners. I term this movement “residential protec-
tionism.” The panoply of home-protective legislation includes bankruptcy 
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protections, property tax relief, and most recently foreclosure reform and 
state eminent domain legislation. Residential protectionism has imposed 
social costs by encouraging excessive investment in residential real estate, 
raising the cost of credit, creating regressive tax subsidies, and frustrating 
land planning.1 Despite these costs, protective legislation has attained the 
stature of moral right. A compelling justification attributed to such legisla-
tion is that it safeguards one’s (particular) home as a wellspring for 
psychological flourishing. Involuntary dislocation wreaks psychological 
devastation and imperils self and identity—one’s very personhood.2 The 
belief that ongoing control of one’s home is a psychological imperative has 
become a tenet of American property law, discussed and conceded in every 
first-year property class and touted extensively in the legal scholarship. The 
legal academy has accepted this theoretical notion as fact and in doing so 
facilitated the home’s illustrious and uncontested reign over American prop-
erty law.3  
Property scholarship spins an alluring tale of how the force of law stands 
as a vigilant guardian over the personal and psychological values of the 
home. Few articles have enthralled property theorists as Margaret Radin’s 
theory that certain kinds of property, including homes, are constitutive of 
personhood.4 Radin argued that ongoing control over objects, such as 
homes, that are “bound up” with one’s self is necessary for proper self-
constitution and psychological flourishing.5 Personhood theory infused a 
generation of scholarship, engraining the notion that homes are special ob-
jects deeply intertwined with psychological functioning. Scholars have cited 
the personhood value of the home to support constraints on government tak-
ings, to justify property redistribution, and more generally to offer a 
long-awaited reprise to economic theory.6 In a separate vein, a number of 
1. See infra Section I.A.
2. See, e.g., Mindy Thompson Fullilove, Root Shock 11–20 (2004) (discussing emo-
tional harms from urban renewal); Megan J. Ballard, Legal Protections for Home Dwellers: 
Caulking the Cracks to Preserve Occupancy, 56 Syracuse L. Rev. 277, 285 (2006) (“[Home] pro-
vides space to develop and express an identity.”); Lorna Fox, Re-Possessing “Home”: A Re-Analysis 
of Gender, Homeownership and Debtor Default for Feminist Legal Theory, 14 Wm. & Mary J. 
Women & L. 423, 434 (2008) (“The impact of losing one’s home on an individual occupier’s qual-
ity of life, social and identity status, personal and family relationships, and for his or her emotional, 
psychological, and physical health and well-being have been well-established in housing and health 
literature.”). 
3. See infra Section I.B.
4. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 958–59 (1982).
5. See id. at 957–59.
6. See, e.g., Barbara L. Bezdek, To Attain “The Just Rewards of So Much Struggle”: Local-
Resident Equity Participation in Urban Revitalization, 35 Hofstra L. Rev. 37, 80, 114 (2006) 
(suggesting a model of resident participation as decision makers and beneficial owners in the urban 
redevelopment projects that displace them through community equity shareholding); John Fee, 
Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 783, 788, 817 (2006) (propos-
ing enhanced compensation schedule for residential takings); Joseph William Singer, The Reliance 
Interest in Property, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 611, 622, 661–62 (1988) (citing Radin’s personhood theory 
and describing how a moral “reliance interest” in property justifies a variety of legal protections and 
rules). 
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community-development and communitarian scholars have advocated legal 
protection of the home based on a theory of territorial social relations rather 
than individual identity. They argue that home protection furthers important 
normative interests by situating individuals in strong and meaningful net-
works of social ties.7 Astonishingly, no one has questioned whether 
empirical evidence exists to support these theories.  
The widely held belief that homes are psychologically vital to their own-
ers has added a gloss of moral legitimacy to home-protective legislation. 
One motivation for legal protection is the desire to safeguard the perceived 
psychological and social value of the home. More often, the impetus is rent 
seeking by special interest groups, competition between states to attract 
residents, or grandstanding by politicians anxious to capitalize on the evoca-
tive chord of home protection.8 The legal mythology of the home (and the 
legal academy’s reflexive acceptance of this notion) has disguised rent seek-
ing with rhetoric and recast economic protectionism as a humanistic 
endeavor.  
Moreover, the mythology of home and residential protectionism are self-
perpetuating. If property law treats the loss of home as the amputation of 
one’s very identity and ability to thrive, then owners are likely to construe 
dislocation as a dire event.9 Thus, residential protectionism creates the very 
demoralization costs it seeks to redress and increases political demand for 
home-protective legislation.  
In light of the social costs of protectionism and the political groundswell 
to “save homes,” it is time for a critical reexamination of the importance 
attributed to maintaining one’s home. Drawing on the research literature in 
psychology, sociology, and demography, this Article argues that there is lit-
tle evidence to support a categorical theory of ongoing control over one’s 
home as a prerequisite to psychological flourishing. Psychology research 
shows that people may like their homes, imbue their homes with a certain 
emotional resonance, and utilize their homes to reflect and display identity. 
But there is scant empirical support for the proposition that homes are requi-
sites of psychological functioning such that object loss imperils the 
dispossessed owner’s self-concept or impedes psychosocial functioning.10 
Indeed, there is little evidence that consumer possessions in general are pri-
mary or requisite constituents of self or flourishing.11 Instead, the empirical 
7. See, e.g., Fullilove, supra note 2, at 14; James J. Kelly, Jr., “We Shall Not Be Moved”:
Urban Communities, Eminent Domain and the Socioeconomics of Just Compensation, 80 St. 
John’s L. Rev. 923, 960–61 (2006). 
8. See William A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influ-
ence Local Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies 4–21 (2001); 
Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, The Market for Deadbeats, 25 J. Legal Stud. 201, 208 (1996). 
9. Cf. Gordon K. Farley & Sidney Werkman, Geographic Change as a Stressor: Develop-
mental Perspectives, in Stressors and the Adjustment Disorders 418, 421 (Joseph D. Noshpitz 
& R. Dean Coddington eds., 1990) (noting psychological resilience to geographic mobility). 
10. See infra Section II.A.
11. One exception that comes to mind is the loss of possessions that are essential for reli-
gious ceremonies or sacred rites. If a specific, irreplaceable object is required for people to engage 
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research indicates that the prerequisites for human flourishing are social 
relations and interaction, not ownership of certain types of property.12  
Community-development and communitarian scholars have long recog-
nized the value of social relations as a normative matter (if not an empirical 
one).13 These scholars take a more instrumental view of the benefits of resi-
dential stability. However, some of these accounts have romanticized 
territorial ties and oversimplified neighborhood social networks.14 Homes do 
not situate individuals in tight-knit communities marked by deep affective 
ties. To the contrary, sociological and demographic research shows that 
neighborhoods are characterized by weak and intermediate ties, and there is 
evidence that neighborhood sociability is in decline.15  
An evidence-based theory of home protection is long overdue, particu-
larly in view of the recent upsurge in home-protective legislation and 
national attention to residential real estate. The humble home has also seized 
the limelight in property scholarship, with heated debates over the psycho-
logical value of the home in the contexts of takings legislation, foreclosure, 
and affordable-homeownership initiatives. Prominent articles have proposed 
compensation models for psychological losses from eminent domain,16 ex-
amined how “homevoters” shape land use law,17 and considered foreclosure 
reform for residential real estate.18  
This Article offers a new perspective on these perennial debates in prop-
erty law by distilling the empirical research on homes. The central claim of 
this Article is that the psychological and social benefits of remaining in a 
particular home do not warrant the vast apparatus of categorical protections 
that pervade American property law. We may opt to retain these protections 
                                                                                                                      
in important religious or cultural practices, then loss of that property is a loss of culture or spiritual 
belief. Kristen A. Carpenter et al., In Defense of Property, 118 Yale L.J. (forthcoming 2009), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1220665. 
 12. See John T. Cacioppo et al., Loneliness Within a Nomological Net: An Evolutionary 
Perspective, 40 J. Res. Personality 1054, 1080–82 (2006); L. Elizabeth Crawford et al., Potential 
Mechanisms Through Which Loneliness Affects Health, 37 Psychophysiology S34, S34 (Supp. 
2000) (describing health effects of loneliness); Mark Snyder & Nancy Cantor, Understanding Per-
sonality and Social Behavior: A Functionalist Strategy, in 1 The Handbook of Social 
Psychology 635, 657 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998). 
 13. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property 
Law, 94 Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1104757; Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1889 
(2005). 
 14. See, e.g., Fullilove, supra note 2; Kelly, supra note 7, at 961; cf. Peñalver, supra note 
13, at 1948–58 (describing homeownership in nonseparatist communities as a weak form of prop-
erty as entrance into social life). 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. E.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59 Stan. L. 
Rev. 871, 871–73 (2007); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 
61, 83–85 (1986). 
 17. See Fischel, supra note 8. 
 18. E.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, Essay, Home Ownership Risk Beyond a Subprime Crisis: The 
Role of Delinquency Management, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 2261, 2278–83 (2008); Grant S. Nelson & 
Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 Duke L.J. 
1399 (2004). 
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for other reasons, but they cannot be justified on a theory of the home as 
psychologically vital. A corollary is that the legal academy has been unduly 
deferential to conjecture about homeowners’ subjective preferences while 
neglecting entirely the data on objective psychological outcomes. In light of 
the psychological evidence, and absent compelling economic or other justi-
fications, I advocate reducing the number and scope of home-protective 
laws. 
This Article focuses on home-protective laws that reduce dislocation and 
extract rents for owners, not on the case for home buying versus renting. Yet 
the subtext of my analysis suggests that, although not fabricated, the bene-
fits of home buying have been overstated and oversimplified. 
Homeownership conveys benefits in the form of transaction cost savings 
from eliminating negotiations with a third party landlord, efficiency gains in 
local knowledge acquired during long-term tenure, and modest increases to 
neighborhood social capital.19 Yet, ownership imposes costs by limiting mo-
bility in response to changed personal circumstances, professional needs, 
and neighborhood decline, and by channeling disproportionate investment 
into an undiversified asset. The research shows moderate, not overwhelm-
ing, psychological gains from homeownership; strikingly, for low-income or 
financially strained owners, there is evidence of psychological harm.20 On 
balance, the benefits of homeownership are not as high or invariable as legal 
scholars have assumed. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to exam-
ine in any detail the comparative merits of home buying versus renting, my 
analysis calls into question the degree of enthusiasm for home buying satu-
rating the legal literature.  
Before proceeding, I offer a few clarifications and caveats. My thesis is 
that the legal scholarship has vastly overstated the primacy of the home, not 
that homes lack any shard of psychological or non-economic value to their 
owners. I acknowledge that dislocation, particularly in contexts such as fo-
reclosure, imposes short-term psychological stress. However, I argue that we 
have been overly attentive to short-term psychological costs and paid no 
heed to long-term outcomes. I do not argue that homelessness is a psycho-
logically benign condition or contest the claim that in contemporary, 
capitalist societies private property rights and some quantum of private 
property ownership (i.e., wealth) is instrumental to personal thriving.21 Ra-
ther, I maintain that the sanctity bestowed by American property law on one 
                                                                                                                      
 19. See Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around 
the Hearth, 116 Yale L.J. 226, 293–97 (2006). 
 20. See infra Part IV.A. 
 21. Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development 12, 75–82 (2000) (de-
scribing central “capabilities” or opportunities for human flourishing, including the right and 
opportunity to hold property, and calling for their use as a moral foundation for constitutional guar-
antees). Based on the influence of her work in India on her thinking about threshold capabilities for 
women, Nussbaum notes that the right and opportunity for women to hold property on an equal 
basis with men “play[s] an important role in self-definition, in bargaining, and in developing a sense 
of self.” Id. at 156; see also Amartya Sen, Commodities and Capabilities 28–32 (1985) (de-
scribing a model of functionings and capabilities as an index of well-being).  
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category of private property, residential real estate, is not warranted based 
on the psychological and sociological evidence.  
To clarify the scope of my analysis, I use the term “home” to refer to 
owner-occupied residential real estate. I focus on owners rather than renters 
because most home-protective legislation safeguards ownership interests; 
however, much of the psychological research applies with equal force to 
renters. My analysis targets the typical homeowner in the United States, not 
the comparatively rare instances of multigenerational family dynasty prop-
erty, uniquely tight-knit enclaves, or extreme separatist communities. Other 
authors have ably addressed legal reforms to protect these special interests.22  
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I considers the array of special pro-
tections for the home in American property law. The legal mythology of 
home underpinning residential protectionism—the belief that one’s home is 
psychologically critical—dominates legal scholarship, legislative debate, 
and cultural consciousness. Home-protective legislation, justified in signifi-
cant part by this vision of the home, imposes high social costs in absolute 
and distributive terms. Part II examines the empirical research on the home’s 
role in self-concept and psychological functioning. I conclude that there is 
scant empirical support for some of the logical distillations of personhood 
theory, namely that homes are primary to self-concept and that disposses-
sion harms long-term psychosocial flourishing. Part III considers an 
alternative justification for residential protectionism—the theory that homes 
root individuals in robust networks of strong, territorial relationships. The 
sociological and demographic literature belies this theory. The research 
shows that community ties are more transient, weak, and replicable than 
commonly assumed. Part IV argues that the misplaced belief in the psycho-
logical primacy of maintaining one’s home has legitimized rent seeking and 
increased the number and scope of home-protective laws. To the extent that 
the justification for protection is psychological, I advocate an evidence-
based and minimal approach to home-protective legislation. Part V responds 
to potential objections to revising the legal theory of home. Part VI consid-
ers by way of illustration how an evidence-based approach to residential 
protection informs current debates in takings law and homestead exemp-
tions.  
I. Residential Protectionism: The Costly Myth of Home 
Residential real estate has become the demagogue of property law. The 
considerable array of home-protective legislation includes homestead ex-
emptions and tenancy by the entirety, tax benefits, and most recently 
                                                                                                                      
 22. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreward: Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 30–31 (1983) (discussing property and contract law protections for 
separatist communities); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L.J. 1315, 1351–52 
(1993) (noting effect of ownership models and exit costs on separatist communities); Nancy A. 
McLaughlin, Increasing the Tax Incentives for Conservation Easement Donations—A Responsible 
Approach, 31 Ecology L.Q. 1, 11–22 (2004) (describing how conservation easements protect prop-
erty with historical, aesthetic, or environmental value, including family ranches and dynasty 
property). 
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foreclosure reform and state eminent domain legislation. These protections 
impose high social costs and encourage regressive income redistribution. 
Political momentum for home-protective legislation derives in part from the 
notion, trumpeted by scholars, legislators, judges, and special interests, that 
residential real estate is a psychologically vital form of property.23 This ide-
ology has cloaked protectionism in the rhetoric of home and encouraged a 
self-perpetuating cycle of legal intervention.  
A. Overproduction of Home-Protective Legislation 
The goal of this Section is to illustrate the panoply of protections grafted 
on to American property, bankruptcy, and tax law.24 These laws enable, or at 
least increase the likelihood, that an owner can retain her residential real 
estate despite creditor claims, government eminent domain action, or market 
fluctuations. Some of these protections, such as homestead exemptions, date 
back to the agrarian economies of earlier eras when loss of home meant loss 
of livelihood. Their persistence in property law underscores the influence of 
rent seeking. Other home-protective laws are modern-day innovations. Piece 
by legislative piece, we have created a regime of what I term residential pro-
tectionism, where homeownership receives greater, categorical protection 
than ownership of other real property and personal property.25  
If home is man’s castle, then it is a veritable fortress for debtors.26 
Homestead exemptions, tenancy by the entirety, and foreclosure-relief legis-
lation help owners to shield a portion of their personal wealth from creditors 
and to retain their homes. State homestead exemptions offer creditor protec-
tion by exempting some or all of the equity in a personal residence.27 Five 
states and the District of Columbia offer unlimited homestead exemptions;28 
in the remainder of states the homestead exemption ranges from a few thou-
sand dollars in Arkansas to a half million in Massachusetts.29 In many states, 
                                                                                                                      
 23. Some of these laws, such as the Texas homestead exemption, originated in the agrarian 
economy of the seventeenth and eighteenth century. The failure to update these laws is due to belief 
in the special nature of home, rent seeking, and competition between states to attract residents. See 
infra Section I.B.  
 24. Although many of these laws stop short of absolute protection and most are not univer-
sally available, they are nonetheless extensive and costly.  
 25. D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 Santa Clara L. Rev. 255, 255–59 
(2006). 
 26. See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform and Homeownership Risk, 2007 U. Ill. 
L. Rev. 323, 329–34.  
 27. See generally Ryan P. Rivera, State Homestead Exemptions and their Effect on the Fed-
eral Bankruptcy Laws, 39 Real. Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 71, 77–91 (2004) (comparing current and 
historical applications of several state homestead exemptions). 
 28  See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 222; Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 41.001–.024 (Vernon 2000). Iowa, 
Kansas, Oklahoma, and the District of Columbia have similar provisions.  
 29. See Homestead Exemption Act of 1981, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-66-210 (1987); Mass. 
Gen. Laws ch. 188, § 1 (2008). For debtors filing bankruptcy, federal law limits the exemption to 
$125,000 for debtors who acquired property during the 1215-day period preceding the date of the 
bankruptcy filing. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(p) (2006).  
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married couples can shield property (frequently the marital residence) from 
the creditors of one spouse by holding the property as tenants by the en-
tirety.30 In one-third of the states recognizing tenancy by the entirety, the 
protection applies only to real estate,31 and in some states, such as Illinois, it 
is limited to the family home.32 On the federal level, the recent Housing and 
Economic Recovery Act requires mortgage lenders to forgive debt above 90 
percent of the appraised value of owner-occupied residential real estate so 
that homeowners can refinance into FHA-insured mortgages.33  
Law also extracts rents for owners and housing industry interests 
through tax benefits. Tax breaks for homeowners include reductions in the 
assessed value of residential homes, credits, deductions, exemptions, and 
ceilings on annual property tax increases. The federal home mortgage inter-
est and property tax deductions provide generous benefits to taxpayers who 
itemize their deductions.34 At the state level, California’s infamous  
Proposition 13 limits property tax increases to two percent per year until the 
house is sold,35 and the “Save Our Homes” amendment to the Florida Con-
stitution caps property tax increases at the lesser of the annual change in the 
consumer price index or 3 percent.36 Homebuyers also reap benefits. For 
example, George Bush’s “ownership society” campaign pledged a host of 
programs to increase the number of homeowners.37 More recently, in the 
wake of the subprime mortgage meltdown, new federal legislation provides 
a first-time buyer tax credit of up to $7,500, which is repayable over fifteen 
years interest free.38  
The impulse of property law to protect and privilege the home has only 
grown stronger since the recent Supreme Court eminent domain case, Kelo 
                                                                                                                      
 30. See John V. Orth, Tenancy by the Entirety: The Strange Career of the Common-Law 
Marital Estate, 1997 BYU L. Rev. 35, 48. 
 31. See Daniel Cho, Tenancy by Entirety, June 20, 2008, http://www.articlesbase.com/ 
finance-articles/tenancy-by-entirety-456469.html. 
 32. See 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1005/1c (2006). 
 33. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–289, § 257(e)(2)(B), 
122 Stat. 2654. When the homeowner sells, however, she must pay the FHA at least fifty percent of 
the appreciation. If the homeowner sells within five years of refinancing the share of the apprecia-
tion, she has to pay a higher amount based on the number of years from the refinancing date. One of 
the rationales for the act is to save the country from economic ruin, but it unlikely that this is the 
sole motivation. During the prolonged stock market crash of the mid-1990s, the government did not 
intervene with massive financial assistance for investors who had lost substantial savings, borrowed 
on margin, or engaged in reckless day trading.  
 34. See I.R.C. § 163(h) (2006); I.R.C. 164(a) (2006); Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little 
House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 Ariz. St. 
L.J. 1347, 1384 (2000). The federal alternative minimum tax has reduced the value of these deduc-
tions for affected taxpayers. 
 35. Cal. Const. art. XIIIA, § 2(b); Daniel L. Simmons, California Tax Collection: Time for 
Reform, 48 Santa Clara L. Rev. 279, 296 (2008). 
 36. Fla. Const. art. VII, § 4(d)(1).  
 37. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: America’s Ownership Society: 
Expanding Opportunities, (Aug. 9, 2004), (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 38. See Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654, § 3011 (2008). 
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v. City of New London,39 incited public outcry. Kelo addressed the question 
of whether the city of New London’s condemnation of residential homes for 
a private redevelopment project met the Fifth Amendment public use re-
quirement. Justice O’Connor’s now famous statement that “any single-
family home . . . might be razed to make way for an apartment building, or 
any church . . . . might be replaced with a retail store” found its mark with 
the American public.40 A flurry of state enactments ensued.41 California 
amended its constitution to prohibit state and local governments from “ac-
quiring by eminent domain an owner-occupied residence for the purpose of 
conveying it to a private person” for economic redevelopment unless the 
eminent domain was necessary for public health and safety reasons.42 Indi-
ana mandated compensation at 150 percent of fair-market value for 
condemnation of an owner-occupied residence.43 Nineteen states adopted 
legislation that shields the iconic middle-class, single-family home by limit-
ing eminent domain for private redevelopment or urban renewal to 
“blighted” areas.44 Despite the fact that residential takings are a small minor-
ity of condemnations,45 they elicit an impassioned response and are at the 
heart of calls for strong private property protection. 
The array of home protections in property, tax, and bankruptcy law has 
proven costly. These laws encourage overinvestment in residential real es-
tate, disproportionately burden lower-income households, raise the cost of 
credit, and frustrate land planning and controlled growth. William Fischel 
has described how “homevoters” demand local land use laws that protect 
and benefit their undiversified investments in their homes.46 A similar  
dynamic affects state and federal home-protective legislation, with home-
owners—joined by business interests—aggressively lobbying for 
protections against the market, the government, and homeowners’ own 
                                                                                                                      
 39. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 40. Id. at 500–01 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 41. Perhaps the greatest impact of Kelo will be its effect on the discretionary decision mak-
ing of government officials who must weigh the benefits of condemnation against potential 
vilification in a Kelo-style media frenzy.  
 42. Cal. Const. art. 1, § 19(b). Colorado, Connecticut, and New Jersey proposed but did not 
enact similar legislation. 
 43. Ind. Code § 32-24-4.5-8(2)(A) (2008). In addition, Connecticut now requires the gov-
ernment to pay 125 percent of the average appraised value of property acquired by eminent domain 
by a development agency, Act of June 25, 2007, Conn. Pub. Act. No. 07-141, 2007 Conn. Acts 407, 
and Kansas requires compensation to all landowners whose property is condemned at 200 percent of 
the appraised value, Act of May 18, 2006, Kan. Chapt. 192, 2006 Kan. Sess. Laws 1345. 
 44. See, e.g., S.C. Const. art. 1, § 13(A) (authorizing legislature to enact laws allowing 
eminent domain to remedy blight with the property put to public or private use); Act of June 25, 
2007, 2007 Conn. Acts 407 (eminent domain for urban renewal allowed only in blighted areas); 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1.08 (West 2008) (defining blighted areas as those where at least 70 per-
cent of parcels are blighted); Act of Mar. 20, 2007, Utah Chapt. 379, 2007 Utah Laws 2326 
(authorizing use of eminent domain in urban renewal if property is blighted). 
 45. Jennie Jackson Miller, Comment, Saving Private Development: Rescuing Louisiana from 
Its Reaction to Kelo, 68 La. L. Rev. 631, 665 (2008). 
 46. Fischel, supra note 8, at 39–97, 207–59. Fischel also describes how homeownership can 
encourage socially beneficial policies, such as investment in local schools. Id. at 129–61. 
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debts.47 States in turn embrace home-protective or home–privileging legisla-
tion to attract wealthy residents and enhance the state’s tax base.48  
Home-protective laws misallocate resources by encouraging excessive 
investment in residential real estate. Surveys show enormous public enthusi-
asm for home buying and widespread awareness of tax benefits and 
favorable lending policies49—an exuberance that is often irrational.50 Legal 
authors routinely claim that the home deserves protection as an owner’s 
largest asset;51 yet it is likely that the home is an owner’s largest asset be-
cause of legislation that protects and privileges residential property. This 
overinvestment occurs at the expense of diversified investments in the equity 
and bond markets and investments in education and human capital.52 Protec-
tive legislation and government home buying assistance convey the message 
that housing is an optimal, low-risk investment. Economists are quick to 
note this misconception. Paul Krugman contends that the home is a high-
risk, undiversified asset that is in essence borrowed on margin.53 In the legal 
scholarship, Rashmi Dyal-Chand challenges the efficacy of homeownership 
for wealth accumulation.54  
Not only does residential protectionism encourage excessive investment 
in residential real estate, it does so at the expense of lower-income house-
holds. The federal tax deduction on mortgage interest, the nation’s third 
largest tax expenditure at a cost of over seventy-two billion annually,55 pro-
vides larger subsidies to higher-income owners who itemize deductions.56 
State laws capping property taxes until resale benefit owners at the expense of 
                                                                                                                      
 47. See, e.g., Ruth Simon, Consumer Groups Push Tax Relief for Homeowners in Bailout, 
Wall St. J., Sept. 27, 2008, at A4. 
 48. See Brinig & Buckley, supra note 8, at 202–03 (describing how the unlimited homestead 
exemptions in Florida and Texas were enacted and retained to attract wealthy residents and increase 
the tax base). 
 49. See Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 277, 326–27 (1998).  
 50. See generally Robert J. Shiller, Irrational Exuberance 3–16 (2d ed. 2005). For 
example, many tax filers who claim the standard deduction mistakenly overestimate the tax savings 
from the home-mortgage interest deduction. Id. 
 51. See, e.g., Fee, supra note 6, at 786–94; Rick Santorum, Wealth Creation in the New 
Millennium: Transforming Poverty in America, 16 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 383, 
391–92 (2002). 
 52. In addition, some commentators argue that subsidizing home buying has negative envi-
ronmental effects and that the home-mortgage deduction exacerbates sprawl by incentivizing buyers 
to purchase larger and more expensive homes. See Mann, supra note 34, at 1384; Mark Andrew 
Snider, The Suburban Advantage: Are the Tax Benefits of Homeownership Defensible?, 32 N. Ky. L. 
Rev. 157, 170–71 (2005). 
 53. See Paul Krugman, Home Not-So-Sweet Home, N.Y. Times, June 23, 2008, at A21.  
 54. Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Privileging Home Ownership, Presentation Before the University 
of Colorado Law School Property Works in Progress Conference (June 13, 2008). 
 55. Daniel Gross, Location, Location—Deduction, Slate, Apr. 14, 2005, http://www.slate.com/ 
id/2116731/. 
 56. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act ameliorates this by allowing taxpayers that 
claim the standard deduction to deduct an additional $500 from their property taxes in 2008. See 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654.  
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new buyers—often first-time buyers and young families.57 These distributional 
issues might be less severe if tax benefits were fully capitalized into higher 
home prices, but the research indicates that the tax benefit is only partially 
capitalized.58  
Home-protective laws also distort credit markets and increase the cost of 
credit. Residents of states with unlimited homestead exemptions pay higher 
interest rates and are at increased risk of credit denial compared to residents 
of states with lower exemptions.59 Poor families are the most severely af-
fected by the increased cost of credit and denial of credit, despite their 
inability to take advantage of unlimited exemptions.60 At the other end of the 
economic spectrum, protections may invite fraud and abuse by elites.61 O.J. 
Simpson evaded the $33.4 million civil judgment against him for his ex-
wife’s death by purchasing a mansion in Florida, and Ken Lay, Enron’s for-
mer CEO, diverted his assets to his multi-million dollar Houston 
penthouse.62 The homestead provisions of the 2005 Bankruptcy Act now 
limit this behavior by creating a $136,875 cap for filers who have committed 
a felony that indicates that filing was an abuse of the bankruptcy process, 
when the debt arises from violation of federal securities law, or in other spe-
cified instances of wrongdoing.63 
On the local level, residential protectionism slows mobility and frus-
trates land planning. Some protectionist legislation, such as property tax 
freezes for owners with tax reassessment upon resale, skews mobility. Own-
                                                                                                                      
 57. See Josephine W. Thomas, Comment, Increasing the Homestead Tax Exemption: “Tax 
Relief” or Burden on Florida Homeowners and Local Governments?, 35 Stetson L. Rev. 509, 551 
(2006) (concluding that tax capitalization occurs “to some extent” with the degree of capitalization 
varying based on households’ expectations about future tax changes, information costs for tax in-
formation, and housing search costs). 
 58. See John Yinger et al., Property Taxes and House Values 143 (1988); David M. 
Brasington, Edge versus Center: Finding Common Ground in the Capitalization Debate, 52 J. Urb. 
Econ. 524, 537 (2002) (showing weaker rates of capitalization in areas where housing supply is 
more elastic). 
 59. Reint Gropp et al., Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand, 112 Q. J. Econ. 
217, 230–31 (1997); see also Richard M. Hynes, Credit Markets, Exemptions, and Households with 
Nothing to Exempt, 7 Theoretical Inquiries L. 493, 512–15 (2006). 
 60. See Gropp et al., supra note 59, at 220. Researchers have not been able to explain why 
poor families are so strongly affected despite the fact that they don’t have enough assets to profit 
from unlimited exemptions. See Hynes, supra note 59, at 515. Perhaps this occurs because the cost 
savings of standardizing and bundling loans outweighs the gains from differentiating between 
households based on their financial ability to benefit from unlimited homestead exemptions. 
 61. See Todd J. Zywicki, Institutions, Incentives, and Consumer Bankruptcy Reform, 62 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1071, 1086–88 (2005). There is some debate about whether home-protective 
legislation systematically increases fraud and abuse beyond a limited number of well-publicized 
cases.  
 62. Cf. Posting of Todd Zywicki to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://www.volokh.com/ 
archives/archive_2005_03_27-2005_04_02.shtml (Apr. 1, 2005, 13:36 EST).  
 63. 11 U.S.C. § 522(q)(1)(A)–(B) (2006); Robert J. Aalberts, From the Editor-in-Chief, 34 
Real Est. L.J. 3 (2005) (describing bankruptcy reforms to prevent abuse). 
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ers relocate at lower than optimal levels for employment markets64 as well as 
in response to changed family and housing needs. At the community level, 
constraints on mobility hinder the “Tiebout model,” where municipalities 
compete to attract residents by providing favorable levels of taxes and ser-
vices.65 Municipalities are less likely to compete to efficient outcomes 
because owners are reluctant to “vote with their feet” and relocate. Other 
forms of home-protective legislation impede community development and 
land planning.66 For example, state legislation restricting eminent domain to 
blighted areas constrains economic development. These laws may drive 
governments to situate public projects farther from economic centers, where 
land is cheaper and more readily acquired—regardless of the potential value 
of the project to a metropolitan area or the effects on sprawl.  
B. The Legal Mythology of Home  
The pervasiveness and variety of home protection in U.S. property law 
suggests that the law reflects (and encourages) a special ethos with respect 
to the home. The attribution of personal and social values to the home dates 
back to the nineteenth-century Romantic philosophy of the home as a para-
dise on earth and a refuge from the corruption and danger of urban life.67 
The legal privileging of homes in the United States, however, did not begin 
in earnest until the New Deal’s “modernized social compact” introduced 
government buyouts of defaulted mortgages, attractive direct lending pro-
grams, and lengthier mortgage amortization periods.68 Political rhetoric and 
business advertising broadcast visions of the “American dream,” “home as 
castle,” and “home is where the heart is.” These ideological campaigns were 
disseminated most effectively by those with a financial interest in a robust 
housing market, such as banks, developers, and real estate companies. The 
marketing of the home as a powerful symbol, coupled with financial incen-
tives, channeled wealth investment to residential real estate and encouraged 
attitudes glorifying homeownership.69  
                                                                                                                      
 64. See Robert B. Riley, Attachment to the Ordinary Landscape, in Place Attachment 13, 
25 (Irwin Altman & Setha M. Low eds., 1992). A contrary argument is that employers benefit from 
homeownership and long-term mortgages because it makes their workforce more stable.  
 65. See Melissa J. Morrow, Comment, Twenty-Five Years of Debate: Is Acquisition-Value 
Property Taxation Constitutional? Is it Fair? Is it Good Policy?, 53 Emory L.J. 587, 597 (2004). 
 66. See generally David A. Dana & Thomas W. Merrill, Property: Takings (2002). 
 67. See Louise Chawla, Childhood Place Attachments, in Place Attachment, supra note 
64, at 63, 64; Carole Despres, The Meaning of Home: Literature Review and Directions for Future 
Research and Theoretical Development, 8 J. Architectural & Plan. Res. 96, 104 (1991). This 
view of the home, and the single-family home in particular, dominated the period of the industrial 
revolution. See Kenneth A. Stahl, The Suburb as a Legal Concept: The Problem of Organization and 
the Fate of Municipalities in American Law, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 1193, 1245 (2008).  
 68. See Ronald Tobey et al., Moving Out and Settling In: Residential Mobility, Home Own-
ing, and the Public Enframing of Citizenship, 1921–1950, 95 Am. Hist. Rev. 1395, 1413–19 (1990). 
 69. See Alan Zundel, Policy Frames and Ethical Traditions: The Case of Homeownership for 
the Poor, 23 Pol’y Stud. J. 423 (1995) (describing effect of the federal “Own Your Own Home” 
campaign and New Deal-era legislation on the ideology of homeownership). Increased home buying 
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A generation later, the concept of the home morphed from social recov-
ery to personal self-development with Margaret Radin’s theory of property 
for personhood.70 This legal theory of home spins a captivating tale of how 
the moral force of law safeguards the personal and psychological values of 
the home. The “personhood” character of one’s home has become a tenet of 
property law, cited ubiquitously and accepted without challenge. Legal 
scholars, joined by legislators and judges, are the modern narrators of this 
myth.  
Radin constructed personhood theory on the basis of moral philosophy, 
including Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. She argued that certain kinds of 
property are so “bound up with the holder” that they are necessary for “self-
constitution” and human flourishing.71 Personhood theory spans a contin-
uum from fungible property, which is freely traded or held for trade, and 
personhood property, the loss of which “causes pain that cannot be relieved 
by the object’s replacement.”72 To achieve proper self-development, an indi-
vidual needs control over resources in the external environment, particularly 
those objects that fall on the personhood end of the property continuum.73 
Radin did not clarify whether her theory addresses the ability to be a person 
or the same person, to be a self or the same self, to be a self as defined by 
the person or a self as constructed by society, or to have a personality in ei-
ther the psychological sense or the philosophical conception of personality.74  
Building on her thought-provoking, if amorphous, theory, Radin argued 
that enhanced legal protection should apply to property for personhood, par-
ticularly if loss of that property means that the “claimants’ opportunities to 
become fully developed persons in the context of our society would be de-
stroyed or significantly lessened.”75 Radin focused on the paradigmatic 
example of homes. She discussed at length how personhood theory informs 
the legal treatment of homes under the First and Fourth Amendments, tenant 
safeguards in landlord-tenant law, and enhanced protection of residential 
homes from eminent domain.76  
Following Radin’s landmark article, a generation of legal scholars 
adopted the personhood perspective and focused in particular on the role of 
the home in human flourishing. The personhood perspective provided the 
normative basis for proposals to protect the “sanctity of home” from the 
                                                                                                                      
encouraged pro-ownership attitudes. Psychologists have long observed that people may or may not 
behave in keeping with their attitudes, but they are very likely to hold attitudes in keeping with their 
behaviors, including purchasing behaviors. See Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory 
Maintenance and Administrative Rulemaking, 63 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 589, 611–14 (2002) (discussing 
the psychological research on behavior-attitude consistency).  
 70. See Radin, supra note 4. 
 71. Id. at 959, 967. 
 72. Id. at 959. 
 73. See id. at 957, 971–72. 
 74. I thank Michael Moore for this point.  
 75. Id. at 978, 1015.  
 76. Id. at 993–1006. Radin offered no empirical evidence to substantiate personhood theory 
or the home as property for personhood.  
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alleged misuse of government eminent domain power, the greedy reach of 
creditors, and the wasteful excess of taxing authorities.77 Commentators 
noted that the home warrants enhanced protection as a psychologically vital 
and archetypal possession—the home is like “an extension of [owners’] 
selves, or like a part of their family.”78 In this view, the home is so critical to 
the maintenance of self and psychological well-being79 that displacement 
amounts to an emotional trauma.80  
In a separate vein, other scholars espoused a theory of residential com-
munitarianism. They focused on harms to residents and their communities 
from the severing of territorial ties. Relocated individuals are at risk of 
“traumatic stress reaction to the destruction of all or part of one’s emotional 
ecosystem” from the loss of social ties and decimation of community.81 Even 
those commentators who questioned the American obsession with home-
ownership conceded that there is an “intuitive sense that rights in our homes 
are different from other types of property ownership.”82  
Legislators have been similarly quick to proclaim the transcendent value 
of the home and of residential stability. The psychological value of home 
has received top billing in the recent debates over foreclosure relief.83 Ad-
dressing the subprime lending crisis and subsequent foreclosures, legislators 
have described the loss of home as “emotionally devastating”84 because 
homeownership “is at the heart of who we are and the dreams that people 
have.”85 People who lose their homes “will feel as if they have lost every-
thing.”86 Homeownership confers psychological benefits by “giving people 
the confidence, self-esteem and the skills” for success in challenging  
                                                                                                                      
 77. See, e.g., Fee, supra note 6, at 787–88; cf. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of 
Well-Being and the Objectives of Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1669, 1725–26 (2003).  
 78. Fee, supra note 6, at 788; see also Bezdek, supra note 6, at 37 (homes are “the anchor 
. . . to body, soul, and family”).  
 79. See, e.g., Fullilove, supra note 2, at 20; Ballard, supra note 2, at 285–87 (“[Home] 
provides space to develop and express an identity.”); Fox, supra note 2, at 434 (“The impact of 
losing one’s home on an individual occupier’s quality of life, social and identity status, personal and 
family relationships, and for his or her emotional, psychological, and physical health and well-being 
have been well-established in housing and health literature.”); Kelly, supra note 7, at 961 (“The 
sudden deprivation of [neighborhood] can itself be a threat to the community member’s sense of 
self.”).  
 80. See Jeffrey T. Powell, Student Article, The Psychological Cost of Eminent Domain Tak-
ings and Just Compensation, 30 Law & Psychol. Rev. 215, 220 (2006) (“Displacement from one’s 
home or property elicits feelings of loss and depression, often generating negative emotional and 
health reactions.”); see also Lorna Fox, The Meaning of Home: A Chimerical Concept or a Legal 
Challenge?, 29 J.L. Soc’y 580, 602 (2002) (describing empirical research as showing that loss of 
home entails extreme reactions of alienation and grief).  
 81. Fullilove, supra note 2, at 11. 
 82. Williams, supra note 49, at 303; see also Barros, supra note 25, at 256 (“Homes are 
different in meaningful ways from other types of property . . . .”).  
 83. See supra notes 27–29. 
 84. 154 Cong. Rec. S2842 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2008) (statement of Sen. Akaka).  
 85. 154 Cong. Rec. S5797 (daily ed. June 19, 2008) (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
 86. 154 Cong. Rec. S2282 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 2008) (statement of Sen. Menendez). 
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economic times.87 Similar themes animate the historical record. A report to 
the 1875 Texas Constitutional Convention on the state’s homestead exemp-
tion proclaimed that the creditor must know that the home “is sacred and 
beyond his reach.”88 Ownership encouraged a certain psychological orienta-
tion, with the homestead exemption “the grandest foundation yet conceived, 
upon which to build up in our State an industrious, independent, self-
sustaining and land-holding yeomanry.”89  
Legislators, both in the historical record and present-day debates, also 
maintain that protection of the home safeguards family relations and fi-
nances.
90
 While this argument may have had merit in the small-scale 
agrarian economy of the nineteenth century, it is not persuasive today. The 
modern family can readily reconstitute itself in new residential settings, and 
minimal levels of asset protection can ensure a fresh start without exempting 
residential real estate altogether.91 
Home-protective legislation offers a focal point for analyzing discon-
nects between legal philosophy and the realities of property ownership. 
Property law has succumbed to theorizing about the home without a glance 
at the relevant empirical research. Even the scholarly criticism of person-
hood theory and residential communitarianism neglects the question of 
evidence; instead these critiques address economic efficiency, object fetish-
ism, the role of political conflict and power relations,92 and failure to 
adequately balance the home interest against competing interests.93 This in-
attention to the empirical evidence is troubling. Personhood and 
                                                                                                                      
 87. 154 Cong. Rec. S7449 (daily ed. July 25, 2008) (statement of Sen. Reed). The legisla-
tive history of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act also includes statements by dozens of 
legislators referring to the “American dream.” E.g., 154 Cong. Rec. S1359–60 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 
2008) (statement of Sen. Martinez) (“People are being foreclosed on, and there are families sitting at 
the kitchen table to see how to save that precious piece of the American Dream they have—their 
home.”). The history also includes statements that legislators must act to stop the “American dream 
[from turning] into the American nightmare,” 154 Cong. Rec. S1407 (daily ed. Feb. 29, 2008) 
(statement of Sen. Menendez), and prevent “people [from] being thrown out of their castles . . . and 
thrown into the moat,” 154 Cong. Rec. S5797 (daily ed. June 19, 2008) (statement of Sen. Boxer).  
 88. Report from N.H. Darnell to Hon. E.B. Pickett (Nov. 5, 1875), in Journal of the  
Constitutional Convention of the State of Texas 569, 569 (1875). 
 89. Id. at 570. 
 90. This argument stems from the agrarian economy at the country’s founding, the dual role 
of home as enterprise, and the restrictions on women holding property or participating in labor 
markets. For example, in the Texas Constitutional Convention, committee members were adamant 
about the need for a homestead exemption to “protect the wife and children in their shelter . . . 
against the calamities of whatsoever kind, even the death of the husband and father.” Id. at 569.  
 91. For a discussion of the interaction between family relations and housing, see Grant 
McCracken, Culture and Consumption II: Markets, Meaning, and Brand Management 
38–46 (2005) (noting that the house is the “stage” for the family and that housing reflects as well as 
constructs social and familial relationships). On the financial point, a family that is struggling finan-
cially may be ill served by retaining a home that they likely cannot afford. 
 92. See Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin’s Theory of 
Property and Personhood, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 347, 353 (1993).  
 93. See Barros, supra note 25, at 280–90 (asserting that the personhood interest is real and 
deserving of legal protection, but that Margaret Radin’s theory imposes too severe a degree of pro-
tection on possessory rights in homes). 
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communitarian theories of property offer inspiring normative visions to the 
legal academy—but simultaneously provide ideological fodder for rent-
seeking interest groups. The high social costs of protectionism indicate that 
an evidence-based account is long overdue.  
II. The Home as Property for Personhood: A Review of the 
Psychological Evidence 
The personhood theory of the home maintains that an individual consti-
tutes herself as a person through a secure and ongoing relationship with 
certain property. Loss of personhood property jeopardizes selfhood and im-
pairs psychological flourishing. Radin clarifies that personhood property is 
more than subjective preferences, but she does not specify whether the loss 
of such property harms the ability to be a self (or the same self), a person (or 
the same person), or to have a personality.94 It is also not clear whether her 
theory targets internally defined selves or socially created selves (i.e., oth-
ers’ view of oneself).95 In light of this underspecification problem and the 
presumably multiconstitutive nature of personhood, the empirical evidence 
cannot “disprove” property for personhood. But, we can look to the research 
for evidentiary support for some of the logical distillations of Radin’s the-
ory. Specifically, the psychology research bears on the propositions of 
whether property is a primary constituent of self-concept and whether prop-
erty loss is likely to impair or radically alter the self, as perceived by the 
dispossessed owner, or to harm long-term psychosocial functioning.  
In psychological terms, the self-constitution described by Radin and 
subsequent legal theorists implicates the concepts of identity and self. The 
psychological correlates of flourishing include development, psychosocial 
functioning, stress, adaptation, and life satisfaction.96 Personality and social 
psychologists have studied the formation and maintenance of self and iden-
tity extensively,97 while environmental psychologists have investigated the 
role of possessions as an “extended self”98 and dwelling as “place identity.”99 
Psychologists and sociologists have also researched the mental-health  
                                                                                                                      
 94. See supra note 74. 
 95. I thank Heidi Hurd for her helpful comments on this point. 
 96. Psychologists conceptualize identity as individuation and differentiation from others, a 
psychological sense of continuity and self-image, and the collected social roles of the individual. 
See Snyder & Cantor, supra note 12, at 651. Self in psychology is a related but broader construct 
that encompasses the formation of self, the social self in interpersonal relations, and the executive 
function of the self as agent and decision maker. See Roy F. Baumeister, The Self, in 1 The Hand-
book of Social Psychology, supra note 12, at 680, 680–81.  
 97. This work investigates the processes of self-perception, self-inference, self-narration, 
self-attribution, and self-esteem, as well as the cultural context, social structures, roles, and groups 
that are the foundations of identity formation and self-knowledge. See Snyder & Cantor, supra note 
12, at 651.  
 98. See Russell W. Belk, Attachment to Possessions, in Place Attachment, supra note 64, 
at 37, 38.  
 99. See Harold M. Proshansky et al., Place-Identity: Physical World Socialization of the Self, 
3 J. Envtl. Psychol. 57, 61 (1983) (describing dearth of empirical research on place identity).  
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impacts of relocation and homeownership. This Part shows that contrary to 
claims in the property scholarship, the home is not a primary construct of 
self and identity, residential dislocation does not typically harm mental 
health, and the relationship between homeownership and self-esteem is 
equivocal.100 Moreover, in contrast to the object focus of personhood theory, 
an enormous body of empirical work establishes that social interactions and 
ties—not possessions—are the bedrocks of psychological thriving.  
A. The Nonprimacy of Home to Self-Constitution  
Possessions, even subjectively important ones, do not form the principal 
tiers of self or identity.101 Instead, the empirical research shows that person-
ality characteristics, values, social roles, and one’s body parts are the 
conceptual categories most closely linked with self.102 For example, a study 
of 1500 American adults asked to “tell me about yourself” found that per-
sonality attributes and role categories (e.g., mother) accounted for 60–72 
percent of the responses, depending on age and education.103 The remainder 
of the responses described activities of the self such as work and hobbies.104 
Another study specifically examined the relative importance of possessions 
vis-à-vis other possible aspects of selfhood.105 Body parts were rated as the 
closest to self, followed by bodily processes and personally identifying 
characteristics such as name or age.106 Possessions fell in the middle of the 
                                                                                                                      
 100. Some of the studies described in this section utilize subject samples composed of both 
homeowners and renters.  The similar trend in the findings across the experiments with renters and 
owners and the experiments comprised solely of owners suggests that the psychological model of 
homeownership presented in this Article may apply with some force to renters. In addition, recent 
empirical research indicates that subjective feelings of ownership, not legal title or status, is the 
critical variable of the psychological relationship to property. For this reason, it is unlikely that the 
addition of renters in some of the experiments undermines the findings. See Jochen Reb & Terry 
Connolly, Possession, Feelings of Ownership, and the Endowment Effect, 2 Judgment & Deci-
sionmaking 107, 110–14 (2007) (finding that subjective feelings of ownership, which were 
enhanced by physical possession, increased monetary valuation in endowment effect experiments; 
objective or legal ownership had no effect).   
 101. Cf. Clare Cooper, The House as a Symbol of the Self, in Designing for Human Behav-
ior 130 (Jon Lang et al. eds., 1974) (theoretical work in psychology discussing application of 
Jungian concepts of collective unconscious, archetype, and symbol to the house).  
 102. See Alan Page Fiske et al., The Cultural Matrix of Social Psychology, in 2 The Hand-
book of Social Psychology, supra note 12, at 915, 927. This finding applies to North American 
people whereas studies of Chinese, Japanese, and Korean respondents find more flexible and situa-
tion-dependent self-concepts. See, e.g., Hazel Rose Markus et al., Selfways: Diversity in Modes of 
Cultural Participation, in The Conceptual Self in Context 13, 29, 37 (Ulric Neisser & David 
A. Jopling eds., 1997). 
 103. Fiske, supra note 102, at 927 (reporting the findings of Diane Holmberg et al., Self-
Making in American Adults: Content, Structure, and Function (2007) (manuscript on file with the 
author)). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Ernst Prelinger, Extension and Structure of the Self, 47 J. Psychol. 13, 15–23 (1959) 
(asking adult subjects to rate eight categories of items on a scale of whether they were “definitely a 
part of your own self”). 
 106. Id. at 18. 
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categories rated for relation to self, surpassing only abstract ideas, other 
people, and objects in the environment.107 
In studies that specifically investigate dwelling, subjects report that 
while their homes are important possessions for both instrumental and sub-
jective reasons, other items are more strongly linked to their sense of self. 
For example, in Belk’s 1987 study, subjects rated ninety-six cards, each rep-
resenting a type of possession (broadly defined to include public places, 
body organs, people and values as well as physical objects) on a four-point 
scale of “self” and “not-self.”108 Not only did relatives, friends, and body 
organs receive higher ratings than own “dwelling,” but so did items such as 
favorite vacation place, hair, and United States.109 Items that were rated very 
similarly to “own dwelling” included favorite casual clothes, favorite vehi-
cle now owned, and favorite book.110 Similarly, in Prentice’s 1987 study, 
fifty college students sorted seventy possessions into as few or as many piles 
as they wished based on similarities in the source of why someone might 
value them.111 The possessions most strongly linked to self were family heir-
looms, diaries, photographs, and old letters, while the family house was 
most frequently grouped with “everyday possessions” such as a bed or tele-
phone.112 Only one quantitative empirical study has found that homes are 
more central to self-construct than other types of possessions.113 In that 
study, Ball and Tasaki asked subjects to rate a list of ten personal posses-
sions on a relation-to-self scale.114 They found that subjects rated the family 
home as most connected to self.115 The evocative phrasing of “family home,” 
and the conflation in the relation-to-self scale of questions about whether 
objects expressed the self with questions about whether objects were part of 
                                                                                                                      
 107. Id.  
 108. See Russell W. Belk, Identity and the Relevance of Market, Personal, and Community 
Objects, in Marketing and Semiotics 151, 154–56 (Jean Umiker-Sebeok ed., 1987). Half of the 
248 adult subjects were renters. We cannot be sure whether the addition of renters attenuated the 
relative ranking of “own dwelling.” Recent evidence suggests, however, that subjective feelings of 
ownership and possession, not legal title, determine the psychological value of property. See Reb & 
Connolly, supra note 103.  
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Deborah A. Prentice, Psychological Correspondence of Possessions, Attitudes, and 
Values, 53 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 993, 995–96 (1987). 
 112. See id. 
 113. A. Dwayne Ball & Lori H. Tasaki, The Role and Measurement of Attachment in Con-
sumer Behavior, 1 J. Consumer Psychol. 155, 166 (1992) (analyzing subject sample of 188 
university students and 143 adults in the surrounding community). Some researchers claim that 
qualitative studies of reactions to burglary describing feelings of “violation” and “pollution” demon-
strate the linkage between self and dwelling. We cannot draw any conclusions from these studies 
with respect to residential real estate because the property lost was personal property and the results 
are confounded by reactions to invasion, trespass, and criminal victimization. See, e.g., Barbara B. 
Brown & Paul B. Harris, Residential Burglary Victimization: Reactions to the Invasion of a Primary 
Territory, 9 J. Envtl. Psychol. 119, 119–32 (1989). 
 114. See Ball & Tasaki, supra note 113, at 162–63. 
 115. Id. at 166. 
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the self, temper this finding.116 As with most research in this area, the experi-
mental design does not clarify whether the home refers solely to the physical 
housing structure or encompasses personal possessions and mementos within 
the home, which researchers have found to be highly expressive of self.117 
The empirical literature also calls into question the utility of Radin’s dis-
tinction between fungible and personhood property (e.g., homes) and the 
assumption that people value the latter more.118 A study of five-hundred ran-
domly selected households found that subjects placed homes at the 
necessities end of the necessities/recreational dimension (together with 
items such as money, furniture, and cars) rather than in the category of sym-
bolic possessions representing self or attachments to others.119 In another 
study, fifty-five percent of people asked to describe the feelings associated 
with their dwelling did not offer responses that referenced emotions—
contrary to what one might expect if people perceived dwellings as person-
hood property.120 Even when property bears a strong relationship to self, 
people do not necessarily prize personhood property over fungible or in-
strumental property. Studies report significant variability among subjects, 
with some owners listing symbolic possessions as their most treasured pos-
session, others favoring instrumental possessions,121 and a number offering 
multiple reasons for valuing a possession highly.122  
There is a considerable difference between the notion that certain ob-
jects, such as homes, express and even help maintain our identities and the 
theory that objects actually construct our identities in a prerequisite sense 
(i.e., “but for” certain property an individual would experience harm to self 
or to proper self-development). The legal scholarship has conflated these 
two concepts. Radin notes that property can serve a self-expressive function 
                                                                                                                      
 116. See id. at 162.  
 117. Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton write, “[o]ne of the most important psychologi-
cal purposes of the home is that those objects that have shaped one’s personality and which are 
needed to express concretely those aspects of the self that one values are kept within it.” Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi & Eugene Rochberg-Halton, The Meaning of Things 139 (1981); see 
also McCracken, supra note 91, at 35 (“These objects are intended to recall the presence of family 
and friendship relationships, personal achievements, family events, ritual passages, and community 
associations.”).  
 118. Radin, supra note 4, at 987 (“There is both a positive sense that people are bound up 
with their homes and a normative sense that this is not fetishistic.”). 
 119. Marsha L. Richins, Valuing Things: The Public and Private Meanings of Possessions, 21 
J. Consumer Res. 504, 508–09 (1994) (mail survey of 500 households). There was no other statisti-
cally significant data on houses. Personal Communication with Marsha L. Richins, July 4, 2008. 
 120. Only 45 percent of the subject sample, which was comprised of owners and renters, gave 
emotional responses, of which only 36 percent were positive. Csikszentmihalyi & Rochberg-
Halton, supra note 117, at 127–28. 
 121. Prentice, supra note 111, at 998. 
 122. Csikszentmihalyi & Rochberg-Halton, supra note 117, at 84–85 (reporting a study 
of the cherished possessions of eighty-two Chicago families); Richins, supra note 119, at 507 
(“[F]or any particular possession several or even all of the meaning dimensions . . . may influence 
its value.”). 
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but she sees that as necessary to self-constitution.123 The research indicates 
that residential real estate serves a primarily self-expressive, not self-
constructive, function.124 Homes and other possessions express attitudes, 
values, personal history, ethnic identity, and self-perceived status, or bolster 
an image of self we wish to convey to others.125 There is evidence that self-
expression through dwelling is effective. Subjects who rate perceived per-
sonality dimensions after viewing an owner’s interior dwelling provide 
ratings that largely correspond to owner’s self-ratings126 and that are more 
accurate than ratings based on behavioral information such as social activi-
ties of the owner.127 However, to conclude that homes deserve legal 
protection from creditors, taxing authorities, and government because of 
their self-expressive capacity seems far-fetched. Citizens of capitalist na-
tions have many ready substitutes for self-expression. Cars, clothes, and 
jewelry serve similar functions of announcing identity and benefit from 
broader visibility. Home decorations can be transferred to a new residence. 
Other alternatives for self-expression, such as group membership, religion, 
and speech do not depend on property at all.  
The legal understanding of personhood property also fails to appreciate 
that identities are multivariate. Not only do we construct our identities in 
multiple ways, we construct multiple identities. Our self and identity are 
comprised from intrapsychic, social, and cultural forces, and we have a mul-
titude of elaborated self-concepts, social self-identities, and even 
remembered selves.128 A social identity in one setting may differ markedly 
from an individual’s sense of self, or personality traits, or from a social iden-
tity deployed in another situation.129 Even “territorial” identities have 
multiple iterations. Individuals may identify not only with their physical 
                                                                                                                      
 123. She writes, “for example, if you express your generosity by giving away fruits that grow 
in your orchard, then if the orchard ceases to be your property, you are no longer able to express 
your character.” Radin, supra note 4, at 968. 
 124. Even researchers who have devoted their careers to elucidating the psychological func-
tion of possessions typically stop short of avowing that possessions construct identity. See, e.g., 
Helga Dittmar, The Social Psychology of Material Possessions 155 (1992) (“[B]road social 
identity dimensions are reflected in, and probably in part maintained by, individuals’ self-reported 
relationships with their personal possessions.”); cf. Despres, supra note 67, at 98 (describing the 
research on the role of possessions in the definition and development of self-identity).  
 125. See Belk, supra note 98; Cooper, supra note 101, at 131 (“The house . . . reflects how 
man sees himself, with both an intimate interior . . . and a public exterior . . . or the self that we 
choose to display to others.”). The expressive capacity of the housing structure varies depending on 
the degree to which the owner’s housing choice was circumscribed by location, commuting time, or 
cost. See Richins, supra note 119, at 518. 
 126. See Edward A. Sadalla et al., House Form and Social Identity: A Validity Study, in Opti-
mizing Environments: Research, Practice, and Policy 201 (Roger R. Stough et al. eds., 1980).  
 127. W. Jeffrey Burroughs et al., Predicting Personality from Personal Possessions: A Self-
Presentational Analysis, in To Have Possessions: A Handbook on Ownership and Property 
147 (Floyd W. Rudmin ed., 1991). 
 128. Snyder & Cantor, supra note 12, at 651–52 (describing multiple levels of agendas for 
self and identity). 
 129. See Sadalla et al., supra note 126, at 202. 
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home but with a certain town130 or type of community settlement (urban, 
suburban, or rural).131 If one constituent of identity is threatened, other 
aspects of identity remain to moor the self. Recent work by Shigehiro Oishi 
and collaborators found that college students who had moved frequently 
rated their skills, abilities, and traits (“personal self”) as more central to self-
concept than group membership (“collective self”).132 Nonmovers showed 
the opposite pattern.133 This finding highlights the adaptability of self and 
identity and bears directly on one interpretation of personhood theory—that 
loss of personhood property negatively affects the self. Multiple moves, at 
least during childhood and adolescence, alter self-concept, but with no indi-
cation of psychological harm.134  
Personhood theory, with its emphasis on continuity and ongoing control 
of property, wrongly assumes that change is detrimental and self and iden-
tity are best left undisturbed.135 The importance of dynamism to identity 
development and self-growth is well established in the diverse fields of so-
cial psychology, sociology, and psychoanalytic psychology.136 The changing 
environment is not an obstacle to growth but a prerequisite for it. Eric Erick-
son’s seminal work on identity development describes identity as a dynamic 
process that balances rootedness and uprootedness throughout the life-
span.137 In the context of residential mobility, psychologists observe that 
relocation “may offer the opportunity for the development of new skills, 
new identity configurations, and the possibilities for considerable growth.”138  
In summary, the weight of the psychological evidence does not support 
the idea that homes, or possessions in general, are strongly constitutive of 
psychological personhood. Specifically, the research fails to substantiate the 
                                                                                                                      
 130. Bonnie Lindstrom, A Sense of Place: Housing Selection on Chicago’s North Shore, 38 
Soc. Q. 19, 35 (1997). 
 131. In her survey of 6000 Denver-area residents, Feldman found that respondents described 
themselves as “city” or “suburb” people, typically lived in the type of settlement they identified with 
both at the time of the survey and in the past, and intended to reside in that type of settlement in the 
future if they relocated. Roberta M. Feldman, Settlement Identity: Psychological Bonds with Home 
Places in a Mobile Society, 22 Env’t & Behav. 183, 192 (1990). 
 132. Shigehiro Oishi et al., Residential Mobility, Self-Concept and Positive Affect in Social 
Interactions, 93 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 131, 134 (2007). 
 133. See id. 
 134. There is no evidence of negative impact on self-concept from typical levels of mobility. 
Extremely high mobility of five or six moves across childhood, however, is correlated with behavior 
problems and worse educational outcomes. See supra note 166. The movers in the Oishi study did 
not fall into this category and reported more modest levels of mobility. See id. 
 135. See Radin, supra note 4, at 1004. 
 136. See Kenneth O. Doyle, The Symbolic Meaning of House and Home: An Exploration in 
the Psychology of Goods, 35 Am. Behav. 790, 795–97 (1992) (theorizing about the changing mean-
ing of housing across adult development); Proshansky, supra note 99, at 59. 
 137. See Eric H. Erikson, Identity and the Life-Cycle 20 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1980) 
(1959); Eric H. Erikson, Identity and Uprootedness in our Time, in Insight and Responsibility 
81 (1964). An “identity crisis” serves as “a crucial moment, when development must move one way 
or another, marshaling resources of growth, recovery, and further differentiation.” Eric H. Erikson, 
Identity: Youth and Crisis 16–19 (1968).  
 138. Farley & Werkman, supra note 9, at 419.  
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theory that loss of “personhood” property impairs self-concept or self-
development. At best, possessions and dwellings are lower-tier aspects of 
self and identity and serve a primarily self-expressive function.  
B. Relocation and Psychological Flourishing 
If homes are critical to human flourishing, as personhood theory 
suggests, we would expect to see psychological studies finding long-term 
mental health harms from involuntary relocation.139 The research suggests 
otherwise. Psychologists and sociologists have studied the mental health 
impacts of relocation extensively. The weight of the evidence indicates that 
residential mobility, even forced relocation, causes short-term stress but 
typically does not affect long-term psychological functioning.140 In general, 
people are highly adaptive to geographic change and typically return to pre-
mobility levels of satisfaction in relatively short order.141 Evidence suggests 
that it takes between six and eighteen months on average to settle and 
establish new social ties.142 Migrants actively manage their relocations and 
create linkages to their former homes by replicating decorating practices,143 
                                                                                                                      
 139. This Article addresses forced relocation to another residence, not homelessness. Home-
lessness has serious mental-health effects due to extreme and chronic stress, insecurity, and 
disruption of social relationships. See generally Judy A. Hall & Penelope L. Maza, No Fixed Ad-
dress: The Effects of Homelessness on Families and Children, 14 Child & Youth Servs. 35, 40–47 
(1990). 
 140. Marc Bolan, The Mobility Experience and Neighborhood Attachment, 34 Demography 
225, 226 (1997) (reviewing evidence suggesting few adverse consequences of increased mobility); 
Peter Steinglass & Ellen Gerrity, Forced Displacement to a New Environment, in Stressors and 
the Adjustment Disorders, supra note 9, at 399, 410 (“[T]he impact of residential mobility is far 
less severe than is commonly hypothesized . . . . This is true even when it is involuntary in nature.”). 
The failure to establish significant psychological harm is especially notable because most studies do 
not control for preexisting mental health or socioeconomic status or other losses suffered in dis-
placement (e.g., loss of family, community or culture, financial losses, etc.). See Steinglass & 
Gerrity, supra, at 413.  
 141. Lee Cuba’s study of 432 migrants to Cape Cod found that only twenty-five participants 
reported that they did not feel at home. See Lee Cuba & David M. Hummon, Constructing a Sense 
of Home: Place Affiliation and Migration Across the Life Cycle 8 Soc. F., 547, 552 (1993); see also 
Peter Marris, Loss and Change 44 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing relocation of residents from the 
central districts of London to the Dagenham Estate in the London suburbs); Catherine Ward & Irene 
Styles, Lost and Found: Reinvention of the Self Following Migration, 5 J. Applied Psychoanalytic 
Stud. 349, 353 (2003) (majority of women surveyed about move from United Kingdom to Australia 
described their migration experience positively). 
 142. See Pamela Lyn Carlisle-Frank, The Relocation Experience: Analysis of Factors Thought 
to Influence Adjustment to Transition, 70 Psychol. Reps. 835, 835 (1992); see also Bolan, supra 
note 140, at 226 (finding that migrants develop attachments to new locations quickly); Steinglass & 
Gerrity, supra note 140, at 411.  
 143. See Roderick J. Lawrence, A Psychological-Spatial Approach for Architectural Design 
and Research, 2 J. Envtl. Psychol. 37, 40–45 (1982). Anthropological studies of nomadic people 
describe how they create continuity through repetitive use of particular furniture arrangements, 
orientation of the home or shelter, and rituals. Carol M. Werner et al., Temporal Aspects of Homes: A 
Transactional Perspective, in Home Environments 1, 8 (Irwin Altman & Carol M. Werner eds., 
1985). 
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continuing family traditions,144 recreating social roles in the new location,145 
and personalizing their new homes with “identity displays.”146  
Forced relocation carries more risk of negative mental health effects 
than voluntary relocation, but for most people the long-term effects are still 
benign.147 Even in cases of severe social disruption most displaced residents 
make a full psychological recovery. For example, the redevelopment of Bos-
ton’s insular, immigrant community of the West End was one of the most 
severe and unsettling mass relocations in the history of American urban re-
newal. The property scholarship routinely cites the formerly tight-knit 
community of the West End, and Marc Fried’s famous study of the dis-
placed West Enders, as evidence of the devastating effect of forced 
relocation. Yet, even in this acute instance of community eradication, Fried 
found that two years after their involuntary removal, 75 percent of former 
West Enders had acclimated to their new homes and only 25 percent re-
ported that they still felt sad or depressed. This impact is modest, especially 
in view of the fact that approximately 10 percent of the general adult popu-
lation suffers depression or another form of mood disorder in a given year.148 
Recovery and resilience are also evident in studies of relocation following 
devastating natural disasters.149 Although some studies find evidence of du-
rable psychological distress, more recent research that controls for variables 
related to the disaster and preexisting mental health problems shows either 
no long-term effects or very small negative effects.150  
The data on long-term outcomes does not mean that residential disloca-
tion is psychologically costless. Dislocation entails short-term stress, and 
                                                                                                                      
 144. Mary Gauvain et al., Homes and Social Change: A Cross-Cultural Analysis, in Envi-
ronmental Psychology: Directions and Perspectives 180 (Nickolaus R. Feimer & E. Scott S 
Geller eds., 1983) (case study of relocation of 50,000 Egyptians to build the Aswan dam); David G. 
Saile, The Ritual Establishment of Home, in Home Environments, supra note 143, at 87, 92. 
 145. Feldman, supra note 131, at 192; Steinglass & Gerrity, supra note 140, at 411. 
 146. Anne Vinsel et al., Privacy Regulation, Territorial Displays, and Effectiveness of Indi-
vidual Functioning, 39 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1104, 1110–15 (1980).  
 147. In their review of research on involuntary relocation, Steinglass and Gerrity conclude 
that there is “little support for a conclusion that most individuals who undergo forced relocation 
should be considered at risk to develop serious mental health problems.” Steinglass & Gerrity, supra 
note 140, at 413; see also Claude S. Fischer et al., Networks and Places: Social Relations 
in the Urban Setting 177–85 (1977) (reviewing research).  
 148. See generally Marc Fried, Continuities and Discontinuities of Place, 20 J. Envtl. Psy-
chol. 193 (2000); see also National Institute of Mental Health, The Numbers Count: 
Mental Disorders in America (2008), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/ 
the-numbers-count-mental-disorders-in-america.shtml#MajorDepressive. 
 149. See Ebru Şalcioğlu et al., Psychosocial Determinants of Relocation in Survivors of the 
1999 Earthquake in Turkey, 196 J. Nervous & Mental Disease 55, 55 (2008); Steinglass & 
Gerrity, supra note 140, at 401. 
 150. See Şalcioğlu et al., supra note 149, at 60 (finding that past psychiatric illness and avoid-
ing reminders of the earthquake were the strongest predictors of post-traumatic stress disorder 
among relocated disaster victims). A few studies have found that forced relocation due to natural 
disaster can actually lead to increased satisfaction with family life and neighborhood relations. See, 
e.g., Thomas E. Drabek et al., The Impact of Disaster on Kin Relationships, 37 J. Marriage & Fam. 
481, 490–92 (1975) (family relations); Harry Estill Moore, Some Emotional Concomitants of Disas-
ter, 42 Mental Hygiene 48, 49–50 (1958) (neighborhood relations). 
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the intensity of that stress varies with the circumstances of the dislocation. 
For example, a family that must relocate due to creditor action has undoubt-
edly experienced significant stress, not only from the relocation but from 
their financial situation. However, the distress from relocation is typically 
not durable (and may in some situations be reduced by parting with a house 
that a family can no longer afford).  
Contrary to its negative depiction in property scholarship, mobility may 
improve mental health and psychosocial functioning in some cases.151 Relo-
cation can offer expanded opportunities for residential satisfaction, 
employment, and even personal growth.152 For example, a 1996 study by the 
U.S. Department of Transportation found that the majority of owners dis-
placed by eminent domain reported that they were able to significantly 
upgrade their housing.153 Relocation and its attendant stresses can also be a 
catalyst for developing coping skills, reaffirming social relationships, and 
mastering a challenging event.154 Fried, author of the West End study, makes 
the provocative argument that low-income individuals’ and immigrants’ 
emotional attachments to residence can become “dysfunctional” when they 
preclude beneficial or necessary life change.155 The sociological evidence 
indicates that mobility is most beneficial to individuals who are living in 
neighborhoods that are in decline or in housing situations that are ill suited 
to their personal needs. Multiple studies have found that homeownership 
can entrap low-income individuals (particularly low-income black owners) 
in unsafe, deteriorating neighborhoods by increasing the cost of exit.156  
For the average owner, residential stability is not a psychological impera-
tive. But do large-scale studies mask negative effects on groups we might 
expect to be particularly vulnerable to residential relocation, such as school-
age children and the elderly? Turning first to children, the research on the  
effect of residential mobility is equivocal.157 Several studies cite detrimental 
                                                                                                                      
 151. On the societal level, migration facilitates cultural diffusion as outmigrants carry their 
norms, values, and social practices with them to new locales. See David L. Brown, Migration and 
Community: Social Networks in a Multilevel World, 67 Rural Soc. 1, 11 (2002). 
 152. See Fried, supra note 148, at 202. 
 153. See Office of Real Estate Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Relocation Retrospec-
tive Study (1996) (on file with author). 
 154. See Farley & Werkman, supra note 9, at 421. 
 155. See Fried, supra note 148, at 203. 
 156. See Douglas S. Massey et al., The Effect of Residential Segregation on Black Social and 
Economic Well-Being, 66 Soc. Forces 29, 52–54 (1987) (finding that the constraints of homeown-
ership on mobility and residential segregation entrap black owners in neighborhoods with high 
crime, poor schools, and dilapidated housing); Scott J. South & Kyle D. Crowder, Escaping Dis-
tressed Neighborhoods: Individual, Community, and Metropolitan Influences, 102 Am. J. Soc. 1040, 
1080 (1997) (“[I]ncreases [in home ownership in poor neighborhoods] will almost certainly have the 
unintended consequence of reducing the likelihood that residents of these areas will leave them for 
better neighborhoods.”). 
 157. In addition to the research on mobility, there are a limited number of studies on the ef-
fects of homeownership on children. This research has found better outcomes for children of 
homeowners, although in some studies the improvement is as modest as 4 to 7 percent. William 
Rohe concludes that the research, totaling four studies, is too sparse to draw firm conclusions. 
William R. Rohe et al., The Social Benefits and Costs of Home Ownership: A Critical Assessment of 
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effects on behavior and educational attainment,158 but recent research calls 
into question the cause and extent of these effects. A 1999 study found that 
most of the negative effects of mobility on academic performance are due to 
preexisting differences in test scores and family sociodemographic charac-
teristics.159 Other research shows that negative outcomes decrease 
dramatically when both parents are involved and supportive of their chil-
dren.160 Extremely high mobility during childhood (in the ninetieth 
percentile, or approximately five or six moves across childhood) is highly 
associated with learning and behavioral problems, although the causal rela-
tionship is unclear.161 Notably, extreme mobility typically affects the 
children of renters, who are more likely to experience dislocation and other 
correlates of socioeconomic disadvantage—and who are not the primary 
beneficiaries of home-protective legislation. In some areas of the country, 
the frequent relocation of renters has become so severe that school districts 
are offering parents rental subsidies.162  
There is stronger evidence of heightened psychological costs to the eld-
erly. Elderly individuals are the least mobile demographic group,163 and they 
report the strongest attachments to home and community, even when con-
trolling for residential tenure.164 Compared with their younger counterparts, 
the elderly report greater coalescence between home and “self”165 and ex-
press higher levels of satisfaction with their homes independent of the 
                                                                                                                      
the Research 21–22 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. LIHO-01.12, 
2001) available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/homeownership/liho01-12.pdf. 
 158. See, e.g., Anita C. Brown & Dennis K. Orthner, Relocation and Personal Well-Being 
Among Early Adolescents, 10 J. Early Adolescence 366, 366 (1990); James S. Coleman, Social 
Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 Am. J. Soc. S95, S95 (Supp. 1988).  
 159. Shana Pribesh & Douglas B. Downey, Why are Residential and School Moves Associated 
with Poor School Performance?, 36 Demography 521, 527 (1999). 
 160. John Hagan et al., New Kid in Town: Social Capital and the Life Course Effects of Fam-
ily Migration on Children, 61 Am. Soc. Rev. 368, 378, 381 (1996). 
 161. It is not clear if frequent moving causes these problems or if the frequent moves are a 
sign of troubled family life. See, e.g., David Wood et al., Impact of Family Relocation on Children’s 
Growth, Development, School Function, and Behavior, 270 JAMA 1334, 1336 (1993). This study 
controlled for preexisting learning and behavior problems in children but did not assess family dys-
function or distress.  
 162. This year, the Flint, Michigan school district began paying $100-per-month rental subsi-
dies to needy families after it discovered that on average half of the students were changing schools 
during the school year. Erik Eckholm, To Avoid Student Turnover, Parents Get Rent Help, N.Y. 
Times, June 24, 2008, at A1. 
 163. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States tbl.29 (128th ed. 
2009), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2009edition.html. Sometimes this 
excessive stability has negative consequences. See also Richard V. Burkhauser et al., Mobility Pat-
terns of Older Homeowners: Are Older Homeowners Trapped in Distressed Neighborhoods?, 17 
Res. on Aging 363, 381 (1995) (finding that older homeowners are less likely to exit distressed 
neighborhoods than younger homeowners).  
 164. See Robert J. Sampson, Local Friendship Ties and Community Attachment in Mass Soci-
ety: A Multilevel Systemic Model, 53 Am. Soc. Rev. 766, 774 (1988) (“[T]he strongest predictor of 
attachment to community . . . is age . . . .”). 
 165. See Belk, supra note 108, at 157–58.  
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home’s physical condition.166 Rather than deriving satisfaction from housing 
amenities like the young and middle aged, home satisfaction for the elderly 
is more strongly tied to family orientation and memories, competence in a 
familiar environment, the value of independent living, and affordability.167 
The research does not clarify causation: does the psychological importance 
of home to the elderly reduce mobility or does immobility drive attachment 
to the home? Also, the studies have not assessed whether the findings indi-
cate attachment to a particular home or the desire to avoid relocation to an 
institutional setting. When considering the justification for home protection 
for the elderly, however, cause is less important than effect. Unlike the be-
nign effect of dislocation in the general population, loss of the home poses 
greater psychological risk to the elderly.  
C. Other Correlates of Flourishing: Homeownership, 
Life Satisfaction, and Self-Esteem 
Home-protective laws shield owners from dispossession and subsidize 
homeownership on the theory that homeownership yields a variety of psy-
chological, as well as economic, benefits. There is evidence of 
psychological gains from homeownership, but these findings are not as ro-
bust as commonly assumed. For example, homeowners do report greater life 
satisfaction than renters.168 However, homeownership is not the primary de-
terminant of life satisfaction; research shows that physical health and the 
quality of one’s marital relationship are much stronger predictors.169  
There is also an absence of evidence that homeownership increases self-
esteem—a surprising finding given that Americans prize homeownership.170 
The evidence is mixed, with four studies indicating only a limited associa-
tion between homeownership and self-esteem and a fifth, longitudinal study 
by Rohe and Basolo finding no positive impact on self-esteem.171 Rohe and 
Basolo’s study of low-income home buyers found no increase in self-esteem 
at eighteen months post-purchase and a reduction in self-esteem at thirty-six 
months post-purchase. Although the authors do not address this point, it 
seems likely that many of the low-income homeowners found homeowner-
ship financially stressful and therefore erosive of self-esteem.172 The 
                                                                                                                      
 166. See id. 
 167. Shirley L. O’Bryant, The Value of Home to Older Persons: Relationship to Housing 
Satisfaction, 4 Res. on Aging 349 (1982). 
 168. E.g., Rohe et al., supra note 157, at 3. 
 169. Norval D. Glenn & Charles N. Weaver, The Contribution of Marital Happiness to Global 
Happiness, 43 J. Marriage & Fam. 161, 163–64 (1981). 
 170. E.g., Williams, supra note 49, at 286; Rohe et al., supra note 157.  
 171. William M. Rohe & Victoria Basolo, Long-Term Effects of Homeownership on the Self-
Perceptions and Social Interaction of Low-Income Persons, 29 Env’t & Behav. 793, 806–07 
(1997). 
 172. See, e.g., John Cairney & Michael H. Boyle, Home Ownership, Mortgages and 
Psychological Distress, 19 Housing Stud. 161, 166 (2004) (finding that homeowners with 
mortgages reported higher stress levels than renters but that renters reported higher levels of 
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equivocal findings in the self-esteem research suggest that self-esteem does 
not inhere in homes as objects but rather in personal expectations, social 
comparisons, and the contextual effects of neighborhoods, domestic situa-
tions, and financial pressures.  
D. Conclusions 
The objective of this Part was to assess the empirical support for the 
psychological claims implicit in the personhood theory of the home, and to 
cast doubt on the traditional theoretical underpinnings of home-protective 
legislation. The psychological evidence does not substantiate several logical 
distillations of personhood theory. Specifically, the evidence supports nei-
ther the primacy of the physical home to self-concept nor the asserted 
impact of home loss on psychosocial functioning. To be clear, I do not claim 
that the existing research proves that homes lack any shard of psychological 
value to all classes of owners. More research disaggregating results based on 
race, income, and equity investment is necessary to clarify whether there are 
differential effects beyond life cycle. Also, existing research has not as-
sessed all aspects of a potential “home interest” or fully delineated 
attachment as a psychological construct. Consistent with an evidence-based 
approach, my analysis acknowledges limitations in the data but proceeds 
from the (sizeable) body of available evidence. This evidence belies the the-
ory that maintaining one’s home is requisite to self-constitution and human 
flourishing. 
III. Residential Communitarianism: Evidence from
Sociology and Demography 
Despite its appeal to non-economic, humanistic values, personhood the-
ory is remarkably atomistic and object focused.173 One claim of this Article 
is that property for personhood has misfired by attaching such transcenden-
tal importance to objects, particularly homes—the true sine qua non of 
personhood is social relationships. An extensive body of research in social, 
health, evolutionary, and clinical psychology establishes that social rela-
tions—not possessions—are nonfungible, irreplaceable, and critical to 
human development.174 Social relationships create a sense of belonging or 
depression, anxiety, and negative mood than homeowners with mortgages); Jacoby, supra note 18, at 
2278–82 (discussing how oversized housing debt and foreclosure impose steep psycho-social costs).  
 173. Margaret Radin recognized in her later work that personhood theory may adopt a com-
munitarian orientation if the property’s essential personhood value is communitarian in nature. 
Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 350, 368 (1986). Her original 
article focused on the role of “things” for personhood but noted that it would “on occasion attempt 
to pay attention to the role of groups both as constituted by persons and constitutive of persons.” 
Radin, supra note 4, at 965.  
 174. See, e.g., Snyder & Cantor, supra note 12, at 654; Fried, supra note 148, at 194 (“Com-
munity attachment appears rooted in the individual’s involvement in local social relations.”); Setha 
M. Low & Irwin Altman, Place Attachment: A Conceptual Inquiry, in Place Attachment, supra 
note 98, at 1, 7. 
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being part of a collective, provide interaction and intimacy, increase our un-
derstanding of society and others, and help develop social norms and 
maintain social order.175 Social relationships also shape the constructs of self 
and identity176 and are highly correlated with mental health.177 Lonely people 
report higher stress, anxiety, and negative mood; have poorer control over 
attention; and experience enhanced perceptions of insecurity and sensitivity 
to threats or rejection.178 Social interaction even benefits physical health: 
loneliness decreases health and longevity comparably to smoking, high 
blood pressure, and obesity.179  
If social relations are the key to flourishing, shouldn’t we protect homes 
on the theory that neighborhoods provide vital social interaction and ties? 
Communitarian theory emphasizes the importance of social relations and 
takes an instrumental view of the benefits of homeownership for residential 
stability. Some communitarian and community development scholarship is 
attentive to the research on neighborhood social networks; other strong-form 
accounts have espoused a far less empirically grounded vision. Specifically, 
some scholars have advocated home-protective legislation (and argued for 
its expansion to renters) based on a theory of residential communitarian-
ism—that homes situate individuals in strong, intimate, and close-knit 
networks of social ties.180 There is a presumption of quite a lot of community 
in these accounts.181  
Legal scholarship has overstated and oversimplified neighborhood social 
dynamics. Contrary to the vision of the homeowner wrenched from her 
close-knit community, the sociological and demographic research shows 
 175. See Snyder & Cantor, supra note 12, at 657.  
176. As Roy Baumeister writes, “[s]elfhood is almost unthinkable outside a social context 
. . . . Selves are . . . tools for relating to other people.” Baumeister, supra note 96, at 680. The devel-
opment of self and identity occurs through reflected appraisal, self-affirmation, and behavioral 
confirmation, among other social processes. See Arthur Aron et al., Close Relationships as Includ-
ing Other in the Self, 60 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 241, 253 (1991); Snyder & Cantor, supra 
note 12, at 652–53. 
 177. For example, relocation causes greater initial distress when an entire community is 
moved, Steinglass & Gerrity, supra note 140, at 406; Clare L. Twigger-Ross & David L. Uzzell, 
Place and Identity Processes, 16 J. Envtl. Psychol. 205, 208 (1996), or when mobility disrupts 
social support systems. Researchers attribute the West Enders’ initial depression and grief from 
urban renewal to disruptions in their atypically strong and territorially based social support systems 
(and arguably to the societal condemnation of residents’ way of life implied by “slum clearance”). 
See Steinglass & Gerrity, supra note 140, at 404. Peter Marris writes of urban renewal in the West 
End and Lagos, “[t]he definition of a slum is also a definition of the people who live there.” Peter 
Marris, supra note 141, at 56 (arguing that grief and bereavement reactions are more likely when 
relocation is used as an instrument of social control or change, rather than of physical development 
of land). 
 178. See Cacioppo et al., supra note 12, at 1073; Crawford et al., supra note 12, at S34. 
 179. This study statistically controlled for known health risk factors, socioeconomic status, 
and prestudy health baselines. See J.S. House et al., Structures and Processes of Social Support, 14 
Ann. Rev. Soc. 293, 297–300 (1988). Lonely individuals experience less social control supporting 
healthy habits and fewer strong ties to people who encourage them to access medical care when 
needed, as well as higher rates of suicide. See id.  
 180. See supra notes 6–7. 
 181. See supra notes 6–7. 
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that neighborhoods are characterized by weak ties and residents have high 
rates of voluntary geographic mobility. The empirical literature also sug-
gests that property scholarship has exaggerated the effects of residential 
dislocation and homeownership on local social capital.  
A. Our Town Revisited: Neighborhoods and Weak Ties 
The myth of home has its counterpart in the myth of community. The ar-
chetype of community that pervades legal thought is a robust territorial 
group with strong, affiliative ties connecting neighbors to one another and to 
neighborhood institutions.182 The empirical evidence shows that territorial 
communities fall far short of the “Our Town” image that animates residen-
tial protectionism.183 Instead, neighborhoods are characterized by weak or 
intermediate ties, meaning that residents talk once in a while, often recog-
nize each other by face, and exchange favors occasionally.184 Initiatives to 
increase social ties in neighborhoods typically succeed in increasing weak 
ties rather than strong social relationships.185 There is also evidence that 
residents, especially higher-income individuals, are content with impersonal 
interaction with neighbors rather than close friendships or repeated mutual 
help.186  
Contrary to legal theories of the intensely social (and socializing) func-
tion of residential property, the evidence indicates that people depend on 
nonterritorial networks to provide the majority of their strong ties as well as 
sense of community.187 The average person has approximately one dozen 
strong social ties, but only two or three of those ties on average are to 
neighbors.188 In response to the survey question, “What are the ways in 
                                                                                                                      
 182. See supra Section I.B.  
 183. See infra Section V.D (discussing unusually close-knit communities).  
 184. See Karen E. Campbell, Networks Past: A 1939 Bloomington Neighborhood, 69 Soc. 
Forces 139, 139 (1990) (discussing an Indiana neighborhood characterized by weak ties similar to 
neighborhoods today). 
 185. See Press Release, ASA News, American Sociological Association, Encouraging Neigh-
borliness: National Website Encourages Neighborliness on the Local Level; I-Neighbors Project to 
Strengthen Community (Sept. 9, 2004), available at http://www.asanet.org/cs/root/topnav/ 
press/encouraging_neighborliness. 
 186. See Avery M. Guest & Susan K. Wierzbicki, Social Ties at the Neighborhood Level: Two 
Decades of GSS Evidence, 35 Urb. Aff. Rev. 92, 105 (1999) (finding based on responses to how 
frequently residents spent social evening with a neighbor versus a non-neighbor friend). One notable 
exception is that residents of rural areas report comparatively stronger neighborhood social ties and 
the weakest non-neighborhood ties. Id. at 103. Satisfaction with community accounted for almost 10 
percent of the variance in life satisfaction among the lowest social class subjects, but only 2.7 per-
cent in the highest income group. See Brown, supra note 151. 
 187. Data averaged across the period of 1974–96 reveal that fully one-quarter of respondents 
never spend a social evening with neighbors, 15% spend a social evening with neighbors once a 
month, and 12% several times a month. Guest & Wierzbicki, supra note 186, at 99 tbl.1. The 
amount of socializing with friends is nearly double. Ten percent of respondents reported never 
spending a social evening with friends, 22% reported spending a social evening with friends once 
per month, and 20% reported spending a social evening with friends several times per month. Id. 
(limiting the category of “friends” to exclude neighbors that are friends). 
 188. Press Release, supra note 185.  
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which you get a real sense of belonging or a sense of community?” over 70 
percent of respondents cited friends and family, while only 25 percent cited 
neighbors or local community.189 Moreover, there is some evidence that 
neighborhood sociability is in decline.190 Robert Putnam notes that between 
1974 and 1998, the frequency with which Americans reported spending a 
social evening with a neighbor fell by one-third.191 Also, across the twentieth 
century, local clubs and organizations remained constant in number, but 
their activities shifted from socializing to political work.192  
While communities typically lack the strong ties attributed to them in 
the legal scholarship, neighborhoods high in collective efficacy boast dense 
networks of weak and intermediate ties. Dense networks of weak ties are 
important for developing norms that facilitate cooperation and reciprocal 
social relations.193 Because weak ties tend to be more diverse and connect 
different groups to one another, they also facilitate community organizing, 
the spread of information and new ideas, informal social control, and the 
support of children.194 Sociologists have criticized as outmoded the view that 
                                                                                                                      
 189. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community 274, 275 fig.77 (2000) (surveying respondents born after 1964). Consistent with the 
decline-of-community thesis as well as theories about enhanced residential attachment among the 
elderly, respondents born prior to 1964 cited friends and neighbors at slightly higher rates and, nota-
bly, almost 50 percent reported that neighbors gave them a real sense of belonging. Id. at 275, 
fig.77. A 1999 study using data from the General Social Survey from 1974 to 1996 found that 
neighborhood socializing had declined, though only slightly. Guest & Wierzbicki, supra note 186, at 
102, 109 (arguing that the data show a slight decline in socializing but do not support “community 
lost” or eclipse-of-community theories). The study also found that the decline in neighborhood 
sociability was greater than the increase in socializing with friends outside of the neighborhood, 
which suggests that sociability in general may be decreasing modestly and that individuals were 
increasingly “specialists” in neighborhood versus non-neighborhood socializing. Id. at 102–03, 109. 
 190. Commentators characterize the globalization era as one of “elective belonging.” See 
Mike Savage et al., Globalization and Belonging 205 (2005) (contending that personal biog-
raphy and identity have taken center stage and the importance of place associations and residential 
history has waned). Classical social theorists contend that the traditional Gemeinschaft community 
of strong and highly interconnected social networks has been replaced by Gesellschaft ties that are 
weak and instrumental in nature. Guest & Wierzbicki, supra note 186, at 94. If the “decline of 
community” school is correct that local sociability and social capital have decreased, it is not due to 
mobility, as mobility, while still substantial, has decreased since the mid-twentieth century. See 
James M. Jasper, Restless Nation 71 (2000); Claude S. Fischer, Ever-More Rooted Americans, 1 
City & Community 177, 177 (2002).  
 191. Putnam, supra note 189, at 105 (noting that in 1974 married Americans reported spend-
ing a social evening with neighbors thirty times a year on average versus twenty times a year in 
1998). 
 192. See Barrett A. Lee et al., Testing the Decline-of-Community Thesis: Neighborhood  
Organizations in Seattle, 1929 and 1979, 89 Am. J. Soc. 1161, 1161 (1984). Collective efficacy does 
not necessarily founder despite reductions in social interaction. Nonprofit organizations play an 
important role in increasing collective action “events” such as fundraisers, blood drives, protests, 
etc. See Alana Conner Snibbe, Bowling Alone?: Civil Society May Not Be in Such Bad Shape, Stan. 
Soc. Innovation Rev. Summer 2006, at 18.  
 193. See Robert D. Putnam, The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life, Am. 
Prospect, Spring 1993, at 35, 36; cf. Kai A. Schafft & David L. Brown, Social Capital, Social 
Networks, and Social Power, 17 Soc. Epistemology 329, 335, 338 (2003) (arguing that social 
capital neglects relations of power and should assume a more conflict-oriented approach). 
 194. See Robert J. Sampson et al., Beyond Social Capital: Spatial Dynamics of Collective 
Efficacy for Children, 64 Am. Soc. Rev. 633, 635 (1999) [hereinafter Sampson et al., Beyond Social 
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“neighborhood is exclusively a primary group and therefore should possess 
the ‘face-to-face,’ intimate, affective relations which characterize all primary 
groups.”195  
The property scholarship has not sufficiently appreciated the impor-
tance—or the replicability—of weak ties. Legal commentators charge that 
the displacement of individuals or communities depletes the accumulated 
“social capital” of cooperation, trust, and reciprocity.196 In most instances 
where home-protective legislation applies, the involuntary relocation of a 
single household or even a number of households will not have a discernible 
impact on social networks.197 For the individual, leaving a community char-
acterized primarily by weak ties does not hinder participation in a similar 
network of weak ties in the new location. From the neighborhood perspec-
tive, weak ties, by their very nature, not only adapt to in- and outmigration 
but benefit from it by creating “bridging” ties to different groups. The evi-
dence that weak ties predominate and social networks benefit from turnover 
undermines the strong-form theory of community underpinning residential 
protectionism.  
B. Demographic Mobility 
The demography research shows that homeowners are far less “rooted” 
than commonly assumed. Home-protective legislation may be shielding 
from the alleged horrors of dislocation people who were quite likely to 
move on their own. The typical American moves fourteen times in her life-
time, twice as often as the average British citizen.198 Approximately 12% of 
the population relocated between 2006 and 2007; of that number 8% moved 
within the same county, 3% to a different county within the same state, and 
2% to a different state.199 High mobility is not a recent phenomenon, but a 
                                                                                                                      
Capital]. Weak ties are important in the rapid spread of information, new ideas, and cultural diffu-
sion as well as in linking individuals to jobs. Mark Granovetter, the pioneering researcher on the 
strength of weak ties, notes that, “[w]hat makes cultural diffusion possible, then, is the fact that 
small, cohesive groups who are liable to share a culture are not so cohesive that they are entirely 
closed; rather, ideas may penetrate from other such groups via the connecting medium of weak ties.” 
Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 1 Soc. Theory 201, 215 
(1983). But see Robert J. Sampson et al., Civil Society Reconsidered: The Durable Nature and 
Community Structure of Collective Civic Action, 111 Am. J. Soc. 673, 673 (2005) [hereinafter 
Sampson et al., Civil Society] (arguing that the density of nonprofit organizations, rather than the 
density of social ties or frequency of neighborly exchange, affects collective action). 
 195. Donald I. Warren, Black Neighborhoods: An Assessment of Community Power 
50 (1975). 
 196. See, e.g., Michèle Alexandre, “Love Don’t Live Here Anymore”: Economic Incentives 
for a More Equitable Model of Urban Redevelopment, 35 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1, 30–31 (2008) 
(“When [urban] renewal plans are implemented, community members are dispersed, and these in-
tangible valuables completely disappear.”).  
 197. The exception is when a large portion of a community, or even an entire community, is 
displaced from a large-scale condemnation project or a rash of foreclosures, for example. 
 198. See Farley & Werkman, supra note 9, at 418. 
 199. U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/tables/09s0031.pdf. 
Moreover, demographers note that there is a substantial amount of temporary, seasonal, or circular 
migration that is not fully captured by census surveys. See Brown, supra note 151, at 11. 
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long-standing American tradition. Historical mobility ranges from a low of 
29% in Indianapolis between 1880 and 1890 to a high of 85% in St. Louis 
from 1840 to 1850.200 There is a distinctive life cycle to migration: young 
adults in their twenties are highly likely to have multiple moves, mobility 
slows in mid life with school-age children, and it drops steeply among the 
elderly.201 Homeownership slows mobility significantly with 7% of owners 
moving between 2005 and 2006 relative to 30% of renters.202 However, 
homeowners still evidence significant overall mobility with a median stay of 
only 8.2 years in one residence.203  
C. Residential Stability, Homeownership, and Positive Externalities 
Many traditional accounts point to homeownership’s role in promoting 
social capital and residential stability as justification for home-protective 
legislation. Empirical analysis, however, suggests that these effects have 
been overstated in the legal literature. The research shows that homeowner-
ship increases positive externalities in the form of social capital, but to a 
smaller degree than commonly assumed. Homeowners are more likely to 
vote, participate in voluntary organizations, and work to solve local prob-
lems.204 However, the differential between homeowners and renters is 
modest. A 1999 research study found that homeowners are only 6% more 
likely to work to solve local problems and 15% more likely to vote in local 
elections than renters.205 Further, much of this difference disappears when 
researchers control for length of residence in the community.206 Tenure  
plays a critical role with long-term renters increasing social capital at levels 
only slightly lower than homeowners. Stable neighborhoods with higher 
proportions of long-term residents, both owners and renters, have  
                                                                                                                      
 200. Tobey et al., supra note 68, at 1398. 
 201. U.S. Census Bureau data measuring change in residence between 2005 and 2006 reports 
that approximately 26% of individuals in their twenties relocated, 15% of those age 30–44, 7% of 
those age 45–64, and 5% or less of those 65 and older. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 163, 
tbl.29; see also Stefan Rayer & David L. Brown, Geographic Diversity of Inter-county Migration in 
the United States, 1980–1995, 20 Population Res. & Pol’y Rev. 229, 242 (2001). In addition, 
highly educated or skilled individuals have higher mobility, particularly when migrating from rural 
to urban areas. See Brown, supra note 151, at 12–14.  
 202. See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 163, tbl.29. 
 203. See Rohe et al., supra note 157, at 13. Even individuals who report satisfaction with their 
residential living situation are oftentimes not committed to remaining in that locale. See Max Lu, Do 
People Move When They Say They Will? Inconsistencies in Individual Migration Behavior, 20 Popu-
lation & Env’t. 467, 473–74 & tbl. 2 (1999). 
 204. See Tobey et al., supra note 68, at 1409 (“Historians have consistently found that home 
owning slows residential mobility . . . .”). 
 205. See Denise DiPasquale & Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are Home-
owners Better Citizens?, 45 J. Urb. Econ. 354, 367 (1999) (controlling for other variables). 
 206. See id. at 374, 377 (finding that between 4 and 92% of the effect of homeownership on 
various measures of social capital occurs because homeownership is associated with lower mobil-
ity). The authors conclude, “This finding suggests that policies that act to limit mobility would end 
up having similar effects to homeownership-enhancing policies on increasing the level of investment 
by individuals in local amenities and social capital.” Id. at 377. 
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increased local participation, greater reciprocated exchange of favors, more 
linkages between children and adults in the community, increased home 
values, and higher levels of neighborhood sociability.207 Of course, there are 
fewer long-term renters than homeowners due to home-protecting and 
home-privileging policies; dismantling protectionist legislation may mod-
estly increase the number of renters, including long-term renters. 
Other common assumptions about the primacy of homeownership to so-
cial capital falter under critical analysis. A frequent refrain in legal 
scholarship is that low rates of homeownership (and thus reduced exit costs) 
inflict grave harm by disrupting social relations and decreasing social capi-
tal.208 Undeniably, there are costs to social relations and social capital from 
increased mobility and declining neighborhood sociability. The research 
literature on loneliness indicates that transient, low-sociability communities 
may also inflict individual harms. However, property law has underappreci-
ated that mobility, and even limited sociability, convey benefits. Mobility 
encourages economic growth and workforce efficiency. It can satisfy chang-
ing individual needs and preferences across the life-span. A lack of 
generalized neighborhood sociability may increase the formation of inten-
tional communities that efficiently target individuals with preferences for 
high sociability or specific ideological preferences (and filter to some degree 
nonsociable freeloaders).209 Perhaps most importantly, the prevailing narra-
tive about social capital and homeownership does not recognize that there 
are many ways other than homeownership to increase local social capital. 
The presence of families with children, local non-profits, and even internet-
based community-building initiatives significantly enhance social capital.  
There is also no indication that home-protective laws (e.g., creditor ex-
emptions, takings restrictions, and tax benefits) are a particularly effective 
approach to fostering social capital. Isolated, individual incidents of home-
owner dislocation typically do not affect neighborhood social capital or 
sociability. Protectionist measures increase residential tenure and enhance 
social capital—but only up to a point. Neither homeownership nor home-
protective legislation produces high rates of multidecade residential tenure. 
                                                                                                                      
 207. See Barbara Brown et al., Place Attachment in a Revitalizing Neighborhood: Individual 
and Block Levels of Analysis, 23 J. Envtl. Psychol. 259, 268 (2003) (stating that tenure increases 
place attachment in declining neighborhoods); Sampson, supra note 164, at 774 (stating that tenure 
increases attachment, social activity, and friendship ties). But see Bolan, supra note 140, at 234 
(finding that new migrants join comparable numbers of local organizations relative to longer-term 
residents). As tenure increases, factors such as socioeconomic background and life cycle become 
less important predictors of social ties and community participation. See Tobey et al., supra note 68, 
at 1412. There is some question about the direction of causality. For example, a 1999 study found 
that nonmigration was higher in countries with high rates of participation in civic associations, 
churches, and local economic organizations, but it could not isolate the causal path. See M.C. Irwin 
et al., There’s No Place Like Home: Nonmigration and Civil Engagement, 31 Env’t & Planning 
2223–38 (1999). 
 208. See Peñalver, supra note 13. For a discussion of balancing autonomy with community 
through limited constraints on exit, see Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 
110 Yale L.J. 549 (2001). 
 209. I thank Nicole Garnet for this point as well as for her helpful comments about the social 
costs of decline of community. 
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Homeownership can be a double-edged sword with respect to collective 
efficacy: William Fischel has described how in some instances ownership 
encourages investment in socially valuable programs, such as education, but 
in other cases promotes rent seeking and externalities.210 In addition, more 
involvement is not always better for local affairs, particularly in consensus-
seeking organizations. Neighborhood organizations benefit from a critical 
mass of participants. The involvement of too many owners with intense 
preferences may impede agreement and action.211  
In summary, the research does not support the claims in property schol-
arship about the strength of social ties, the communal nature of residential 
neighborhoods, or the degree of importance ascribed to homeownership for 
fostering social capital.  The vision of tight-knit and low-turnover communi-
ties that animates home-protective legislation is a far cry from the realities 
of residential living. This is not to claim that there is no social value to low-
turnover, close-knit, or sociable communities. Rather it is to suggest that 
there are advantages and disadvantages to sociability and stability—and to 
argue that home-protective legislation is not an effective means to achieve 
the potential gains from communality.  
IV. Rethinking Residential Protectionism 
The notion that one’s home is a psychological requisite has profoundly 
affected American property law. This mythology of home has cloaked rent 
seeking in the guise of moral compulsion and encouraged the overproduc-
tion of home-protective legislation. It has also misallocated protection by 
creating categorical measures without regard to life-cycle effects. Contrary 
to the assertions of legal commentators and the intuitions of citizens, main-
taining one’s home is not critical to self-definition. It is not a primary 
constituent of identity. It is not even a particularly effective facilitator of our 
personal happiness. In order to stem the tide of residential protectionism, 
and perhaps reverse some of the most abusive home protection shelters, it is 
time to change the way we think about the home.  
A. Dismantling the Legal Mythology of Home:  
Implications for Property Theory 
The legal academy, normally so adamant about rigor, proof, and distilling 
truth through the adversarial clash of ideas, has been remarkably reluctant to 
challenge the psychological ideal of home.212 The implicit paradigm for home 
                                                                                                                      
 210. See Fischel, supra note 8. 
 211. This may create a dynamic analogous to the anticommons where numerous property 
holders and property fragmentation hinder beneficial trades and socially desirable outcomes. See 
generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx 
to Markets, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 621 (1998). 
 212. For example, in eminent-domain cases fair-market value compensation should enable a 
displaced owner to purchase in the same community. Even individuals or families struggling with 
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protection has become the gun-toting woman on her porch protecting her 
property, the perpetually and aggressively tearful plaintiffs in Kelo, and the 
unique cultural enclave that was Poletown. These exceptional cases are the 
idealized norm that lurks, often unspoken, in the background of legal dis-
course about the home. Meanwhile, the average citizen who has lived in 
several different residences, does not have many close ties to her neighbors, 
and won’t experience psychological devastation from relocation has been all 
but forgotten.  
The reflexive acceptance of the mythology of home and its persistent in-
fluence in property law result from a conflagration of political coalition, 
economic self-interest, and popular culture. Residential protectionism has 
made unlikely bedfellows of conservatives who wish to protect private as-
sets and limit government intervention and liberals who support wealth 
redistribution and market intervention to advance dignitary concerns.213 Cul-
tural thought has created a false resonance to the home by conflating the 
affective meaning of home as social belonging, nurturance, and biography 
with the bricks-and-mortar housing structure.214 Robert Riley observes, “The 
idea of home matches what seem to be our instincts, but how far have these 
instincts been conditioned by culture and even cliché?”215 The rhetoric of 
home has become part of our cultural understanding, in many cases parroted 
verbatim by owners. A more polished (but arguably no less sophisticated) 
iteration of the home as psychologically sacrosanct dominates the legal lit-
erature. 
An evidence-based analysis has important implications for property 
scholarship. First, although the research cannot “disprove” personhood the-
ory in the sense of direct hypothesis testing, the weight of the evidence does 
not support the psychological distillations of personhood theory with respect 
to self-constitution and human flourishing. The unsettling conclusion is that 
a theory of property protection, and specifically home protection, has domi-
nated legal scholarship for almost three decades without empirical support. 
Abandoning personhood as the dominant noneconomic justification for le-
gal safeguards promotes a healthy skepticism of protectionist laws and 
encourages more precise discourse on the values and preferences underlying 
property protection. It is likely that many people are primarily attached to 
the home not as a personhood or social asset, but as an economic asset—it is 
the potential loss of the home’s financial value that provokes psychological 
                                                                                                                      
creditor claims may be able to relocate within the same town depending on housing affordability 
and the local rental market.  
 213. See supra note 2. 
 214. This is evident in the legislative history of the recent federal foreclosure legislation. For 
example, in his statements supporting foreclosure relief, Senator Menendez noted, “Home. Home is 
where we are brought from the hospital when we are born. It is home we come to. Home is where 
we are nurtured take as we grow . . . Home is where, in fact, we also share moments of sorrow. 
Home is where we often take care of a sick or dying loved one. Home is the very essence of the 
American dream.” 154 Cong. Rec. S1406 (Feb. 29, 2008). 
 215. Riley, supra note 64, at 25. Riley further observes, “Home is often identified as the ar-
chetypal landscape . . . . Home is magical.” Id. 
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distress. If this is true, it provides further evidence that homes are fungible 
property, no different from other economic assets. We may decide as a soci-
ety, after weighing the costs and benefits, to protect economic assets or 
not—but presumably these assets should be treated equivalently.  
Moving beyond the confines of personhood theory, there is no evidence 
of another form of compelling psychological interest or vital attachment to 
the physical home.216 Of course, the lack of evidence does not prove the 
point. As is always the case in evidence-based analysis, research has not 
measured all conceivable elements of the problem at hand. There may be a 
home interest as of yet unidentified in the research literature, or a height-
ened attachment based on race, income, or gender. For example, home 
protections may promote security (i.e., the ability to plan one’s affairs with-
out the threat of future dislocation) and thus reduce both psychological costs 
and transaction costs. However, security is neither an inevitable byproduct 
of ownership (as demonstrated by the recent foreclosure crisis) nor a univer-
sally positive attribute (as shown by the finding that homeownership often 
entraps lower-income owners in declining neighborhoods). Moreover, spe-
cial protections for ownership are not the only way to provide reasonable 
security or respect psychological attachments—private contracting for 
longer rental terms or more favorable lease-renewal options can also provide 
long-term assurances.  
This Article contends that legal theory and reform must move forward 
based on the best available evidence. In view of the current body of evi-
dence, and the specific finding of benign long-term outcomes from 
relocation, it seems unlikely that attachment, security, or an alternative psy-
chological interest justifies the degree of home protection in American 
property law. If subsequent psychological research proves otherwise, then 
an evidence-based approach not only encourages, but requires, further theo-
retical revision.   
The empirical research also challenges communitarian and community-
development theorists who aver a “strong-form” version of territorial com-
munity. Dislocated individuals are not ripped from the bosom of close-knit 
neighborhoods and consigned to dwell in social isolation. To the contrary, 
individuals who relocate readily adapt and typically form new social ties.217 
Even scholars with more modest goals for neighborhood sociability may be 
fretting unduly about the effects of dislocation. For example, some scholars 
are apprehensive that increased mobility from low exit costs, specifically 
renting rather than owning, will reduce social interaction and relations.218 In 
                                                                                                                      
 216. There is evidence, as discussed in Part III, that dislocation that results in reduced social 
interaction and relationships is detrimental. Also, dislocation that separates families or impacts 
family relations is likely to impose psychological harm. 
 217. See Carlisle-Frank, supra note 142. In cases where owners have atypically strong territo-
rial attachments, they may be able to relocate in the same county or even neighborhood. Census data 
shows that 60 percent of geographic moves are within the same county. See, e.g., U.S. Census Bu-
reau, supra note 163, tbl.32. 
 218. See Peñalver, supra note 13, at 1948–50. 
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light of the low level of neighborhood socializing, this does not appear to be 
a pressing concern.219  
Last, the research literature exposes the distinctly classist nature of the 
theories of property for personhood and residential communitarianism. 
Property theorists equate homeownership and “staying put” with liberty, 
dignity, and autonomy for poor residents. Sociologists view the same phe-
nomenon as economic entrapment. If the positive effects of homeownership 
are not sufficient to reverse a declining neighborhood, then homeowners 
may end up entrapped by the high costs of exit (i.e., selling a house in a de-
clining area or market). The groups most at risk for residential entrapment 
are black, low-income, and elderly owners.220 In poor areas, there is evidence 
that residential stability increases depression and anxiety, despite the fact 
that it increases sociability and social ties.221 Residential stability also has a 
weaker effect on decreasing perceived social disorder in poor neighborhoods 
compared to more affluent areas.222 Disturbingly, the evidence suggests that 
home-protective legislation is not only economically regressive but psycho-
logically regressive as well.  
B. Rent Seeking Masquerading as Moral Conviction 
Stripping away the ideological veneer of home reveals that rent seeking, 
not personhood, lies at the core of residential protectionism. Some propo-
nents maintain a sincere belief in the psychological importance of home. 
More often the support for home protection comes from business interests 
and homeowners who seek to extract rents (as well as politicians who wish 
to appeal to these constituencies). Business interests lobby for legislation 
that encourages investment in residential property and enhances lending 
profits; “homevoting” elites demand measures that increase the value of 
their homes and the financial benefits of homeownership. Notions of self-
constitution, human flourishing, and community are used primarily to sway 
the electorate.223 If the concern were about residential stability as a psycho-
logical requisite, protection would extend to a wide range of dwellings that 
residents identify as their homes.224 Not only does the law fail to protect and 
                                                                                                                      
 219. Moreover, the likely outcome of decreased neighborhood sociability or enhanced geo-
graphic mobility is that individuals compensate with increased social interaction in other domains, 
such as religious or recreational activities. 
 220. Rohe, et al., supra note 157, at 14–15. 
 221. Ross et al., supra note 177, (“[Neighborhood stability] does not benefit the mental health 
of residents of poor neighborhoods, and there is some evidence that it makes it worse.”). 
 222. Id. at 592. 
 223. See Fischel, supra note 8. 
 224. See Clare Cooper, The House As Symbol, 3 Design & Env’t 30, 31 (1972) (describing 
efforts by the city of Berkeley, California to make it illegal to live in a converted truck or van and the 
unsuccessful efforts of the “Rolling Homes Association,” formed by owners of such homes, to pre-
vent the passage of this local ordinance); Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and the 
Struggle for Affordability, 42 Wake Forest L. Rev. 511, 513, 548 (2007) (noting the reductions in 
federal funding for public housing and describing generally how the enthusiasm for the virtues of 
home dwindles when applied to housing for low-income people or people of color).  
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privilege nontraditional homes, such as vans or truck-bed shelters, it fre-
quently bans them though zoning laws and local ordinances.  
The notion that homes are critical to psychological flourishing and 
communitarian ideals legitimizes legal protection and cloaks rent seeking as 
a moral right. Residential protections in American property law owe their 
existence, or at least their maintenance, to interests that have harnessed the 
persuasive force of home to extract special privileges. Those with a genuine 
belief in the psychological importance of home have been lulled by this vi-
sion to neglect the rent-seeking character and distributional consequences of 
home-protective legislation.225  
Attributing psychological exigency to maintaining one’s home creates a 
self-perpetuating cycle of legal protection.226 Law and social norms mutually 
reinforce one another and exacerbate protectionism. When property law 
treats the loss of a home as a profound psychological insult, homeowners 
are more likely to experience residential dislocation as a disastrous event—
or to politically capitalize on the likelihood that others think this way.227 
Elected officials, sensitive to the preferences and attitudes of their constitu-
ents, face political incentives to enact home-protective legislation.  
The result has been the overproduction of home-protective legislation 
and an ideological climate of residential protectionism. The growth of 
home-protective legislation has not followed a linear trajectory. Instead, it is 
a veritable hydra—cutting off one protectionist law prompts other legisla-
tion to sprout in its place. For example, in the past three decades, the 
prevalence of tenancy by the entirety protection has decreased among the 
states and rent control has virtually disappeared. Yet, the hefty federal bail-
out of homeowners and lending institutions in the recent federal foreclosure 
act gainsays these advances. Indeed, the recent wave of state eminent do-
main enactments, varying in stringency from symbolic to financially and 
politically burdensome, suggests that protectionism is on the upswing.  
In light of the current political groundswell to “save homes,” it is time to 
adopt an evidence-based account of the psychological and social value of 
maintaining one’s home. Deconstructing the legal mythology of home will 
not end rent seeking. However, recognition of the role of rent seeking may 
reduce the broad base of political support for home protection, at least with 
respect to liberals seeking an opposite pattern of wealth redistribution. A 
more realistic vision of the psychological interest in the home can alter 
                                                                                                                      
 225. Or perhaps they have concluded that the ends justify the means and the psychological 
interest in homeownerships trumps social costs and even distributional concerns.  
 226. Stephen Schnably criticizes Margaret Radin’s emphasis on consensus in defining prop-
erty for personhood: “The ideal of the home is not one simply constructed by individuals, but is one 
that has been actively fostered by the state and other ‘private’ actors wielding significant social 
power. . . . [S]ince the law itself often shapes consensus, purporting to rely on consensus to shape 
the law is a dangerous exercise in circularity.” Schnably, supra note 92, at 373–74. 
 227. The objective degree of harm may be less important than the cognitive response and 
meaning assigned to it. See Farley & Werkman, supra note 9, at 421.  
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norms and erode (or at least hold constant) the bulwark of home-protective 
legislation.228  
C. A Minimal Theory of Home Protection 
To the extent we have premised residential protectionism on a misguided 
psychological conception of the home, it is time to revise our legal ap-
proach. We may wish to retain home protections for other reasons. But they 
cannot be justified on a theory of the home as psychologically special, 
whether advanced on the basis of sincere belief or rent seeking. We must 
rethink our vision of the home and, absent other justifications, curtail home-
protective and home-privileging laws. As a preliminary effort in this direc-
tion, I advance in this Section a minimal approach to home protection on 
psychological and social grounds, sketching the broad outlines of a radically 
downsized theory. I leave the task of formulating detailed policy prescrip-
tions for individual home-protective laws to scholarship that considers the 
particularized economic and political context of each law.    
As a starting point, the problems associated with residential protection-
ism underscore the need for reform. In the aggregate, residential 
protectionism has proven excessive, costly, and regressive.229 It has also de-
livered a surprisingly modest psychological payoff.230 Undeniably, there are 
political challenges to reform. As a matter of policy, however, it is clearly 
time to start disassembling the edifice of protectionist legislation.  
A minimal approach to residential protection advocates reducing the 
scope and number of home-protective laws, at least to the extent that such 
laws are based on psychological and social rationales. This approach also 
objects to laws that offer categorical protection to owners as an undifferenti-
ated class. For example, absent alternative justifications, we should 
contemplate eliminating, or at least restricting to vulnerable subgroups, spe-
cial protections against creditors.231 Similarly, based on the psychological 
and sociological evidence, there is little to recommend the privileging of the 
home for tax purposes or for protection against eminent domain—other than 
the obvious political momentum for these measures. Government interven-
tion in the mortgage crisis is questionable on both psychological and non-
psychological grounds. Foreclosure relief, if it is necessary at all, should be 
targeted to communities threatened with destabilization.  
A major stumbling block to adopting a minimal approach to home pro-
tection has been the fear that homeownership will founder on the shoals of 
                                                                                                                      
 228. One point of comparison is how the legal censure of the tobacco industry and lobby 
altered national attitudes about smoking. The changed ideological climate enabled high cigarette 
taxes which in turn weakened the tobacco industry and modestly reduced the prevalence of smok-
ing. See David Mendez & Kenneth E. Warner, Adult Cigarette Smoking Prevalence: Declining as 
Expected (Not as Desired), 94 Am. J. Pub. Health 251, 251 (2004). 
 229. A large body of economic and legal literature criticizes the cost-benefit calculus and 
distributional effects of home-protective laws. See supra notes 54–71. 
 230. See supra Part II. 
 231. See infra Part VI.B. 
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the free market. The international evidence suggests, however, that downsiz-
ing residential protections will not markedly reduce homeownership. 
Countries such as Canada, which do not offer comparable tax benefits and 
protections, have similar rates of homeownership.232 In most instances, we 
can minimize or eliminate home-protective laws without decreasing home-
ownership and its beneficial effects on residential tenure and transaction 
costs. 
D. Life-Cycle Effects and Home Protection 
If protection for the psychological value of home is needed at all, it 
should focus on safeguarding vulnerable subgroups rather than protecting 
homeowners categorically. In some circumstances, there are evidence-based 
justifications for extending narrowly tailored protections to vulnerable 
groups. Life-cycle research finds that the elderly experience greater distress 
and less favorable psychological outcomes from residential dislocation. 
Compared with other demographic groups, home protection for the elderly 
confers greater benefits relative to its costs. This research offers a new per-
spective on existing legal protections in addition to suggesting avenues for 
reform. For example, the data sheds light on a contentious issue in afford-
able housing law—special programs for the elderly. Legal commentators 
have criticized local governments for disproportionately creating special tax 
benefits and affordable housing for elderly residents who do not strain the 
local coffers with the expense of educating children.233 These scholars have 
questioned the fairness and efficiency of focusing benefits on senior citizens 
rather than other needy groups such as families with children.234 It may be 
that these legal measures respond to the high psychological value many eld-
erly residents attribute to aging in place. This explanation does not preclude 
the local-wealth maximization rationale but instead raises the possibility that 
these disparate motivations are operating concurrently.  
In addition to tax relief and affordable housing, there may be other con-
texts where special protection for the elderly is warranted by the economic 
and psychological cost-benefit calculus. These measures need not take the 
form of absolute protection; the law can also respond to the special interests 
of the elderly with enhanced compensation or more intensive relocation as-
sistance.  
                                                                                                                      
 232. See Robert Guy Matthews, Is it Time to Remodel the Homeowners Tax Break?, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2005, available at http://www.realestatejournal.com/buysell/taxesandinsurance/ 
20051102-matthews.html. 
 233. See, e.g., Robert C. Christopherson, Missing the Forest for the Trees: The Illusory Half-
Policy of Senior Citizen Property Tax Relief, 13 Elder L.J. 195, 211–14 (2005). 
 234. See id. 
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V. Revising the Legal Theory of Home: 
Objections and Considerations 
This Part considers potential objections, both normative and positive, to 
revising the legal theory of the home. Specifically, I consider the issues of 
subjective preferences, the psychological costs from loss of control, the fear 
of mass destabilization, and protection of atypically close-knit communities. 
I conclude that none of these concerns warrant the level of strong, categori-
cal protections for owners currently engrafted on American property law. 
A. Preferences Versus Flourishing 
If people attach high psychological value and subjective premiums to 
their homes and hold intense preferences to avoid relocation, are these suffi-
cient justifications for home-protective legislation? The data is limited and 
does not provide a conclusive account of the prevalence, intensity, or adap-
tability of preferences for housing. Sixty-eight percent of Americans own 
their own home,235 and surveys find a strong preference for homeownership 
versus renting.236 Owners frequently, though not universally, report emo-
tional connections with their homes and express satisfaction with their 
residential situation (if this were not the case many would have moved).237 
However, a significant minority of respondents report that they “don’t feel at 
home” or express dissatisfaction with their homes.238 These studies do not 
address whether the respondents feel that an emotional connection to their 
current home is transferable to a new location. Also, the research leaves 
open the question of the relative intensity of preferences for homes versus 
preferences for relationships, work, status, group membership, or money. 
Only one empirical study in the legal scholarship, to my knowledge, ex-
amines the subjective valuation of homes in excess of market value. In a 
study of the psychology of eminent domain, Janice Nadler and Shari 
Diamond asked participants the amount of money they would require in a 
hypothetical eminent domain scenario to sell a residence with a $200,000 
market value that had been in the family for two years. The majority of sub-
jects demanded compensation above fair-market value and 5.2 percent 
                                                                                                                      
 235. U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership: Table 13: Home-
ownership Rates by State: 1984–2007, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ 
hvs/annual07/ann07t13.html (providing 2006 and 2007 homeownership rates for all states). 
 236. See Susan Saegert, The Role of Housing in the Experience of Dwelling, in Home Envi-
ronments, supra note 143, at 287, 297. 
 237. See Richins, supra note 119, at 508–09.  
 238. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 148, at 199 (analyzing 2622 interviews of class-stratified and 
geographically diverse sample that found “latent dissatisfactions” with home emerging in inter-
views); Gabriel Moser et al., Appropriation and Interpersonal Relationships: From Dwelling to City 
Through the Neighborhood, 34 Env’t & Behav. 122, 129 (2002). In particular, low- and middle-
income residents of multifamily housing, and elderly residents of high-rises report much lower 
satisfaction levels and affective ties to home. See Sue Weidemann & James R. Anderson, A Concep-
tual Framework for Residential Satisfaction, in Home Environments, supra note 143, at 153, 165.  
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refused to sell altogether.239 The study also assessed responses to a more un-
usual ownership situation where the property had been in the family for one 
hundred years; subjects who received this scenario were more likely to re-
fuse to sell and demanded higher compensation premiums.240  
This evidence suggests that people attach substantial subjective value in 
excess of market value to their homes, at least in the context of private rede-
velopment or government projects. In general, we expect that owners 
ascribe subjective value to their homes; otherwise the home presumably 
would have changed hands in a market exchange. It is not clear, however, 
whether people attach more subjective value to homes than other items. 
Hundreds of experiments have confirmed that people experience “endow-
ment effects” and demand a premium to sell any good that they own.241 Buy-
sell experiments using mugs that subjects have owned for less than an hour 
find that subjects demand twice as much on average to sell their mugs than 
to buy identical ones.242 In light of the endowment effect data, it is difficult 
to discern whether the subjective premiums reported in the Nadler and  
Diamond experiment are specific to homes.  
Even if future empirical research finds that Americans report exception-
ally high psychological and subjective value for their homes, there are still 
important reasons to hesitate before legalizing an array of enhanced protec-
tions. First, as a policy matter, it is dubious whether we should accord 
particularly strong protection to individual preferences for consumer goods. 
Faced with a moral hazard, there is an incentive for individuals to exagger-
ate their degree of attachment to goods in order to qualify for legal benefits. 
Second, in any discussion of preferences, the stickiness of law and norms is 
problematic. Because government policy, including homebuyers’ programs 
and the home mortgage interest deduction, has shaped preferences and at-
tachments to home, there is what Stephen Schnably terms a “dangerous 
circularity” to creating legal protections on the basis of these preferences.243  
The extent to which we should privilege preferences is drawn most seri-
ously into question by recent research showing that people consistently 
misestimate the emotional consequences of preference satisfaction or pref-
erence frustration. Groundbreaking research in affective forecasting (our 
ability to predict what will make us happy in the future) and hedonic adapta-
tion (our adaptability to life events or changed circumstances) finds that 
                                                                                                                      
 239. See Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman Diamond, Eminent Domain and the Psychology of 
Property Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker Identity, 5 J. Empirical Legal 
Stud. 713 (2008) (finding, in addition, that the valuation premium was only moderately sensitive to 
the purpose or circumstances of the taking). 
 240. Id. A second experiment looked at subjective premiums in a voluntary negotiation with a 
developer and reactions to a subsequent attempt by the government to take the property by eminent 
domain and resell it to the developer. Id. at 737–42. 
 241. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase 
Theorem, in Advances in Behavioral Economics 55, 55–74 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004). 
 242. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase 
Theorem, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1325, 1329–36 (1990).  
 243. See supra note 226. 
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people systematically overestimate the intensity and duration of the happi-
ness experienced from expensive consumer goods.244 The same “impact 
bias” leads people to overestimate the anticipated sadness and upset from 
negative events and underestimate the speed with which they will recover.245 
Some research suggests that loss aversion, the strong preference to avoid 
losses rather than acquire gains, occurs because individuals overestimate the 
hedonic impact of losses and underestimate the hedonic impact of gains.246 A 
2003 study provides evidence that forecasting errors and hedonic adaptation 
occur specifically in housing. Student participants in a dormitory-housing 
lottery significantly overestimated the emotional impact of receiving or not 
receiving their preferred housing choice.247 This occurred in part because 
participants placed undue weight on the physical features of their housing 
and less emphasis on social features that were less variable between housing 
units.248  
The disconnect between owners’ perceptions regarding housing and ob-
jective outcomes suggests that people either misperceive their preferences or 
that these preferences are less important than we have assumed for out-
comes. We have been overattentive to conjecture about public preferences at 
the expense of objective, long-term data.249 Reversing this pattern allows an 
evidence-based theory of home protection to replace political grandstanding 
and supposition.  
B. Castles and Control 
Another potential objection to my account is that it construes psycho-
logical costs too narrowly. Specifically, it may be that the psychological 
harm from home loss stems from the loss of control that accompanies resi-
dential dislocation, not from the unique character of the home.250 An 
                                                                                                                      
 244. See Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting: Knowing What to 
Want, 14 Current Directions Psychol. Sci. 131, 131 (2005).  
 245. See id. Moreover, once people have made a decision, they selectively search for confirm-
ing information in print and media sources, other people, or even their own cognitions and 
“selective” memory to validate the wisdom of the decision. 
 246. This occurs because people underestimate their tendency to rationalize losses and overes-
timate how much they would dwell or ruminate on losses. Deborah A. Kermer et al., Loss Aversion 
Is an Affective Forecasting Error, 17 Psychol. Sci. 649–53 (2006); see also Daniel Gilbert, 
Stumbling on Happiness 165–67 (2006). 
 247. See Elizabeth W. Dunn et al., Location, Location, Location: The Misprediction of Satis-
faction in Housing Lotteries, 29 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1421, 1421 (2003). 
 248. Id. 
 249. If in the future we have better data on subjective preferences and valuation and their 
relationship to psychological outcomes, it may be troublingly antidemocratic to dismiss preferences 
altogether. At this juncture, we do not need to reach that point because the evidence on psychologi-
cal value and subjective preferences is limited. In addition, if people do hold strong preferences, 
those preferences may be the creation of law, and there is strong evidence of systematic error in our 
preferences relative to outcomes.  
 250. Ironically, in some cases home-protective laws may cause, rather than prevent, psycho-
logical harm from control deprivation. Procedural reforms that protract, but do not ultimately avoid 
the loss of home expose owners to repeated, ongoing deprivation of control. Melissa Jacoby has 
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extensive literature in psychology establishes that exercising control over 
outcomes and avoiding prolonged exposure to uncontrollable situations are 
important to mental health.251 People deploy a variety of strategies and be-
haviors to assert and maintain control over their environment. For example, 
researchers in human territoriality observe that people create boundaries, 
mark territory, and personalize places or objects to enhance actual and per-
ceived control.252  
Despite the psychological significance of control, it seems unlikely that 
loss of control over one’s residence causes durable psychological harm or 
justifies residential protectionism. If loss of control predicted negative out-
comes, we would expect the long-term data on involuntary relocation to 
show impacts on mental health. Yet, the research indicates that relocation 
rarely causes lasting harm.253 This is likely due to the ability of dislocated 
individuals to shift the need for control to other domains of life, such as in-
terpersonal relationships, work, religion, and recreation. The research on 
control deprivation suggests that we have a global need for control over out-
comes and mastery of our environment. If we lose control in one situation, 
we can compensate by asserting control in another domain.254 
I contend that the home has been falsely constructed in legal conscious-
ness as a looming symbol of our personal control. Notwithstanding 
voluminous scholarship on the home as a symbol of autonomy,255 anyone 
who has lived in a home with other people knows that it is not a bastion of 
personal control—to the contrary, it is a training ground for negotiating loss 
of control. In our homes, we are subject to changing family relations, the 
habits and whims of our neighbors, natural forces including disasters, 
changes in zoning and other residential laws, and fluctuations in the real 
estate market. Perhaps the lack of durable harm from involuntary relocation 
is due to the fact that (despite our protestations of home as castle) we don’t 
truly expect to exercise enhanced control over our homes.  
                                                                                                                      
advocated streamlining and expediting foreclosure procedures to reduce psychological stress. See 
Jacoby, supra note 18, at 2281–83. 
 251. See, e.g., Nancy L. Pittman & Thane S. Pittman, Effects of Helplessness Training and 
Internal-External Locus of Control on Mood and Performance, 37 J. Personality & Soc. Psy-
chol. 39, 44–46 (1979); W. R. Miller & Seligman, Depression and Learned Helplessness in Man, 
84 J. Abnormal Psychol. 228, 228 (1975); see also Mark D. Pagel et al., Loss of Control, Self-
Blame, and Depression: An Investigation of Spouse Caregivers of Alzheimer’s Patients, 94 J. Ab-
normal Psychol. 169, 174–80 (1985).  
 252. See Despres, supra note 67, at 99–100.  
 253. See supra Part II.B.  
 254. See Pittman & Pittman, supra note 251. 
 255. These accounts discuss strong property rights in the home as protecting autonomy from 
government intervention. This perspective emphasizes autonomy as a normative value and accord-
ing to critics fails to appreciate the interrelatedness and social nature of property ownership. See, 
e.g., Peñalver, supra note 13.  
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C. The Fear of Mass Destabilization 
One fear underlying home-protective legislation is that without legal in-
centives and intervention, homeownership rates will drop. This in turn will 
prompt mass residential destabilization and a host of social ills. Indeed, 
there is evidence that low homeownership rates and frequent residential 
turnover disrupt community institutions, weaken social ties,256 and increase 
crime and disorder.257 However, for these ill effects to occur, residential in-
stability must be extremely high. A 2000 study found that social disorder 
increased when people lived in census tracts where the majority of respon-
dents had moved within five years.258 Research suggests a tipping point for 
neighborhoods at 85 percent renter-occupied units.259  
Contrary to the assumptions in the legal literature, residential stability 
does not require that residents remain glued to their homes or that the gov-
ernment offer massive subsidies for homeownership. Because 
neighborhoods are comprised primarily of networks of weak ties, they not 
only adapt to but benefit from all but the highest levels of residential turn-
over.
260
 In most cases, eliminating home-protective laws will not have a 
significant effect on neighborhood stability or homeownership.261 Very high 
rates of localized home loss, such as foreclosure epidemics in certain areas, 
are likely to lead to instability and decline. However, home-protective legis-
lation typically fails to address these harms by focusing on individual 
factors that qualify owners for assistance, not on macro-effects or neighbor-
hood-targeted assistance. Moreover, the communities at highest risk for 
decline receive the least benefit from home-protective legislation because 
they are largely renter occupied.  
D. What About Poletown?: Protection for Exceptional Communities  
Although the focus of this Article is on the typical homeowner, I briefly 
address here the issue of protection for exceptionally tight-knit communi-
                                                                                                                      
 256. See id. 
 257. The causal relationship is not clear. It may be the case that problem-driven neighbor-
hoods lead to large amounts of outmigration and decrease residential stability. See Fischer, supra 
note 190, at 180. 
 258. See Ross, supra note 177, at 592. 
 259. See Rohe, supra note 157, at 14 (tipping point data controls for poverty and other socio-
economic factors). 
 260. Robert Sampson explains that residential stability does not mean stasis but rather the 
“social reproduction of neighborhood residential structure, typically when population gains offset 
losses and home values appreciate.” Sampson et al., Beyond Social Capital, supra note 194, at 636. 
Similarly, Coleman’s theory proposes that the continuity of community structure (not specific resi-
dents) facilitates social capital. See James S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (1990); 
Coleman, supra note 158, at S95–105. 
 261. For example, the gradual reduction of tax benefits for the home should not cause mass 
residential instability or social unrest when phased in over a long period of time. Condemnation of 
large parts of a neighborhood or an entire community is an obvious exception that would cause 
community instability or destruction respectively. However, eminent domain of this type is relatively 
rare. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
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ties. Residents of unique immigrant enclaves, rural areas with multi-
generational tenure, and other atypically close-knit communities may ex-
perience heightened social and psychological distress from relocation.262 In 
many cases, protections for these communities already exist in property law. 
For example, common-interest communities can reduce the risk of residen-
tial instability from creditor claims or other sources by creating contractual 
rights of first refusal or, in the case of co-ops, financial vetting of owners 
prior to the purchase of co-op shares.263 The Uniform Conservation Ease-
ment Act, enacted in a majority of states, enables homeowners to retain 
possessory rights while donating their development rights in exchange for 
generous tax benefits.264 Easements frequently protect environmentally valu-
able property, but they may also be used to “preserv[e] the . . . cultural 
aspects of real property.”265 In a similar vein, historical landmarking and cul-
tural registry programs prevent large-scale real estate development and 
discourage eminent domain.266 In addition to formal legal protection, cus-
toms and norms may protect close-knit communities. For example, there is 
evidence that government officials avoid condemning residential property 
and churches.267 The condemnation of Poletown and subsequent transfer of 
the land to General Motors was an aberration born of economic exigency—a 
fact that is often overlooked in accounts of that case.268  
When existing law does not protect close-knit communities, additional 
safeguards may be necessary. This Article questions categorical home pro-
tection for owners based on high social costs and limited psychological 
value. I do not claim that home protection is never warranted. As with the 
elderly, there may be narrow circumstances when, in the face of severe psy-
chological harm, the cost-benefit calculus favors enhanced protection or 
compensation for idiosyncratically close-knit communities. 
VI. Applications 
The primary contribution of this Article is to establish that the prevailing 
legal theories of the home lack empirical support and to advance an evi-
dence-based approach to home protection. I do not aim to provide a 
comprehensive prescription for legal reform for each of the many  
                                                                                                                      
 262. See Fried, supra note 148, at 198 (“Community attachment is certainly most profound 
when social relations are embedded in the socio-cultural organization of current and past group 
affiliations and identities based on ethnic- or class-cultural parameters . . . .”). 
 263. See Heller, supra note 211. 
 264. See Uniform Conservation Easement Act, § 1(1) (1981).  
 265. Id. 
 266. For eminent domain, landmarking or registration would provide evidence that the prop-
erty is not blighted and would increase political resistance.  
 267. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
 268. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Mich. 1981) 
(“The power of eminent domain is to be used in this instance primarily to accomplish the essential 
public purposes of alleviating unemployment and revitalizing the economic base of the commu-
nity.”); see also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  
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home-protective measures animating property law. By way of illustration of 
my evidence-based model, however, this Part offers some preliminary 
thoughts on how a revised theory of the home informs current debates in 
property law. Among the possible applications of this theory, I consider the 
issues of residential takings and homestead exemptions.  
A. Eminent Domain 
In the wake of Kelo, states have enacted legislation, both substantive and 
symbolic, addressing residential takings.269 These reforms illustrate the dy-
namic of residential protectionism and the hyperbole regarding the 
psychological value of the home. This legislative sea change has attracted a 
great deal of scholarly attention. Commentators have vigorously debated 
proposals for eminent domain compensation for the subjective value of 
home.270 Tom Merrill has suggested that residential owners receive one per-
centage point above fair market value compensation for each year they have 
lived in a home.271 Bell and Parchomovsky advocate a preference-revealing 
solution where the government may take property for the owners’ stated 
subjective value but owners are taxed on that value and must sell for at least 
that price.272   
Presumably, a major component of subjective value is the psychological 
and social value of a home to its owner.273 Before answering the normative 
question of whether or how to privilege subjective value, we should consider 
the degree to which two of its components, psychological and social value, 
accrue to the home. My analysis imports an objective element to subjective 
value that may be objectionable to some readers. However, the alternative of 
compensating solely on subjective preferences is vulnerable to moral hazard 
and arguably too narrow a conception of personal value.   
An evidence-based theory of the home redirects the perennial debate 
over subjective compensation to the fundamental question of whether sig-
nificant psychological value inheres in the home. The empirical research, 
                                                                                                                      
 269. Margaret Radin’s article was prescient in its discussion of options for enhanced protec-
tion against eminent domain, including a prima facie case against government taking of personhood 
property, property rule protection against eminent domain for “a special class of property like a 
family home,” or a requirement that that the government demonstrate a “compelling state interest” 
or that the taking is the “least intrusive alternative.” Radin, supra note 4, at 1005–06. 
 270. See, e.g., Posting of Ilya Somin to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/archives/ 
archive_2008_06_01-2008_06_07.shtml#1212704224 (June 5, 2008, 19:17 EST) (explaining Edu-
ardo Peñalver and Ilya Somin’s debate on California’s Proposition 99). 
 271. See Merrill, supra note 16, at 84. 
 272. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 16, at 871. But see Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Identi-
fying Intense Preferences, 94 Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1274811# (arguing that such schemes penalize people 
for high value, which undermines the efficiency goal of economics to move property to its highest-
valuing user). 
 273. My discussion of subjective value compensation emphasizes the psychological and so-
cial value of home rather than the stress and disruption of moving. Relocation-assistance acts offer 
some compensation for the psychological and transaction costs of the moving process.  
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described in detail in Parts II and III, shows that for the general population 
there is scant psychological value to self-constitution, long-term psycho-
social functioning, and social relationships from maintaining one’s home. 
Recent studies also suggest that owners’ subjective preferences for their 
homes may be erroneous—that is, they may systematically overestimate 
their attachments to their homes and the psychological costs of relocation.274  
When the other components of subjective value are modest, the  
psychosocial aspects of home loss may not warrant sizeable compensation 
premiums or the administrative costs of options approaches.275 For exam-
ple, one proposed schedule of compensation for “personal detachment 
from the home” suggests compensation premiums of 28% for owners who 
have lived in their homes 14–16 years and as high as 40% for owners with 
tenure of twenty to twenty-two years.276 Indiana recently adopted a flat 
compensation requirement of 150% of fair market value regardless of ten-
ure in the residence.277 In light of the evidence that people recover rapidly 
from relocation and the fact that fair market value compensation often en-
ables relocation within the same town or county, these compensation 
premiums appear dramatically oversized. For the non-elderly owner, the 
psychosocial component of home loss, on average, merits only a far more 
modest premium.278  
The empirical evidence illuminates other weaknesses in current propos-
als for eminent domain compensation. Tenure-based compensation 
premiums (and fair-market value) neglect the life-cycle effects of residential 
attachment.279 These compensation approaches do not address, for example, 
the differences between the average thirty-five-year-old couple without chil-
dren who has lived in their home for fifteen years and the average seventy-
five-year-old man who has lived in his home for fifteen years. The research 
suggests that compensation premiums or enhanced relocation assistance are 
best directed to elderly residents with long-term tenure.280  
                                                                                                                      
 274. See Gilbert, supra note 246, at 160–70. 
 275. See supra Parts II & III. 
 276. Fee, supra note 6, at 818. 
 277. Ind. Code § 32-24-4.5-8 (2008).  
 278. My account does not preclude a premium for all owners (residential and nonresidential) 
for nonpsychological subjective value or for inside information as to market value. To the extent that 
subjective value represents psychological attachments or other psychological interests, however, the 
research suggests that typically this portion of the premium should be modest. 
 279. Proposals to allow localities to select the level of compensation that owners will receive 
are responsive to differences in social ties between communities (e.g., high turnover urban locales 
versus rural areas with multigenerational tenure), but require further fine-tuning to respond to life-
cycle differences. See Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of Property 
Protection, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 883, 910–11 (2007). Presumably, localities could provide differen-
tial compensation or relocation assistance to the elderly under such a scheme although it is not clear 
if there is sufficient political incentive to do so.  
 280. There are several options for responding to the heightened psychological costs of dis-
placement for the elderly. We could adopt options schemes that allow individuals to periodically 
reset the valuation figure for takings. Alternatively, we could modify Merrill’s proposal so that it 
offers additional compensation to the elderly. For example, elderly people who have lived in a home 
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Unlike tenure-based compensation plans, options schemes can be highly 
responsive to life-cycle changes and subjective preferences. However, op-
tions proposals may unduly burden elderly and other high-valuing owners. 
Bell and Parchomovsky’s plan allows owners with high psychological at-
tachment, such as the elderly, to set above-market subjective value prices at 
the time of a proposed taking.281 These prices are then the basis for taxation 
and a minimum sales price requirement. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir has ar-
gued persuasively that such plans penalize people for holding high values, 
contrary to the efficiency goal of value maximization.282 In addition, re-
search showing that subjective preferences may not track objective 
psychological losses raises a conundrum for compensation.283 Provocatively, 
this suggests that schemes that encourage people to reveal their subjective 
preferences may not be utility maximizing because people are often wrong-
headed in their preferences.284  
B. Homestead Exemptions 
Homestead exemptions impose high costs on society by raising the cost 
of credit and inviting abuse. As a categorical matter, there is little to recom-
mend these laws. If the concern is that families have sufficient resources for 
starting over, there are other ways to meet that goal without offering blanket 
exclusions or hefty protection for homes (which are, after all, an expensive 
consumer good with ongoing costs to maintain). The modest psychological 
value of residential stability to individual owners and the high social costs of 
homestead exemptions, particularly in states such as Florida and Texas with 
unlimited exemptions, make these laws a classic example of residential pro-
tectionism.  
The only potentially compelling justification for (limited) homestead 
exemptions is the needs of vulnerable demographic groups, such as school-
age children and the elderly. The case for homestead exemptions for fami-
lies with school-age children is relatively weak.285 As discussed previously, 
for more than a threshold duration of perhaps ten to fifteen years could receive a premium for each 
year of residence (i.e., above any compensation directed at non-elderly owners). Alternatively, eld-
erly owners who meet the threshold might receive a premium for each year in residence past the age 
of sixty-five. Tying the premium at least in part to years in residence past the age of sixty-five may 
help differentiate between the (statistical minority of) elderly who relocate for retirement versus 
those who elect to remain in place. In light of the significant empirical evidence that elderly indi-
viduals are not similarly situated to other owners, none of these proposals should run afoul of equal 
protection concerns. 
 281. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 16. 
 282. See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 272. 
 283. See Gilbert, supra note 246, at 160–70. 
 284. For an illuminating and comprehensive discussion of options schemes in property law, 
see Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1399, 1401–02 (2005). 
 285. Cf. Peter M. Carrozzo, Tenancies in Antiquity: A Transformation of Concurrent Owner-
ship for Modern Relationships, 85 Marq. L. Rev. 423, 460–64 (2001) (advocating extending 
another form of creditor protection, tenancy by the entirety for married couples, not only to same-
sex and cohabitating couples but also to single-parent households with children). 
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the evidence of harm to children from normal levels of relocation is equivo-
cal. There is a stronger case for targeting limited homestead exemptions to 
the elderly, who experience heightened psychological costs from relocation. 
Elderly people are more likely than other demographic groups to have terri-
torial attachments and to depend on immediate neighbors to watch out for 
them or do favors. In addition, the search costs of finding new housing are 
higher and the physical process of relocation more difficult.286Assuming that 
homestead exemptions are capped at a reasonable level, perhaps the median 
property value in the county, there may be justification for providing nar-
rowly tailored protection to the elderly (or at least enhanced relocation 
assistance).287 
Currently, no state limits eligibility for the homestead exemption based 
on the life-cycle model. A few states, however, increase the amount of the 
exemption for the elderly. For example, California varies the amount of 
homestead exemptions between $50,000 and $150,000 based on age and in 
recognition of elderly debtors’ reduced earning potential and heightened 
need for assets.288 South Dakota has similar legislation that increases the 
homestead exemption from $30,000 to $170,000 for owners seventy years 
of age or older.289  
Given the risk that homestead exemptions will raise the cost of credit, it 
is an open question whether the psychological benefits to elderly owners 
outweigh the social costs of exemptions. It may also be the case that the 
growing availability of private market mechanisms, such as reverse mort-
gages, reduce the need for legislative protection. Reverse mortgages allow 
homeowners to extract equity from their homes without selling the house—
in other words, to loan themselves money from their housing principal and 
appreciation. In addition, a life-cycle model of homestead exemptions does 
not solve the underlying fairness issue of providing heightened asset protec-
tion for owners versus renters.290  
In summary, if there is any case to be made for homestead exemptions, it 
is for long-term elderly owners. If we decide to retain this type of protection 
for humanistic reasons, it makes sense to target demographic groups that 
suffer distinct harms from relocation. Even in this narrow circumstance, 
however, the social costs and potential for abuse may not justify retaining 
the homestead exemption. The special case of the elderly highlights the need 
                                                                                                                      
 286. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 16, at 902 (“[T]he cost of transition is especially 
high for elderly owners, meaning they likely face higher transaction costs in replacing property.”). 
 287. For example, limited homestead exemptions could apply exclusively to homeowners over 
the age of seventy who have maintained the same residence for at least ten years. Because home-
stead exemptions offer bankruptcy protection, there are constraints on the frequency of their use. 
These exemptions may aid an elderly person struggling with an unusual debt or medical bill but 
should not repeatedly assist elderly homeowners with chronic debt or unaffordable living situations.  
 288. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 704.730(a) (West 2009). 
 289. See S.D. Codified Laws § 43-45-3 (2009).  
 290. Perhaps legal reforms could offer comparable levels of financial protection to elderly 
renters without requiring that the asset take the form of housing. 
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for more research on the costs and benefits of targeted protection in the con-
text of individual home-protective laws.  
Conclusion 
The notion of the home as a psychologically special object deserving 
heightened protection has dominated property law and theory. Scholars have 
argued that the home is a paradigmatic form of property for personhood—
critical to an individual’s very identity and ability to flourish in society. 
Other commentators have maintained a communitarian vision of the home 
rooting individuals in tightly knit communities. Contrary to the theoretical 
claims in property scholarship, the empirical evidence indicates that the 
psychological and social importance of the home has been vastly overstated. 
The psychological value attributed to the home has masked rent seeking as 
moral conviction and greased the wheels of the residential protectionism 
machine. To the extent we have premised protectionism on the psychologi-
cal primacy of home, it is time to rethink the protection and privilege 
accorded to residential property.  
